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ABSTRACT 
This thesis identifies the effects of mobilization on Marine Corps Reserve non-prior 
service (NPS) personnel continuation rates.  The research evaluates the retention effects 
of reservists’ expectations about mobilization by analyzing retention data from three 
separate time periods—Pre-9/11, Overlap-9/11, and Post-9/11. 
The analysis used monthly observations for NPS reserve enlisted personnel who 
have completed their initial 6-year obligated drilling contracts.  This research analyzed 
the end of contract “waterfall” period, which describes the drastic drop in reserve 
continuation that takes place upon the completion of NPS reservists drilling obligation.  
Analysis was performed using multivariate models for each time period, which consider 
the effects of mobilization, as well as other explanatory variables for demographics, 
military performance, education benefits, unit type, geographic region, and 
unemployment rate. 
The effects of mobilization on continuation were found to differ depending on 
mobilization duration, frequency, and time period.  Factors negatively influencing 
continuation were found to include general overseas deployment and longer 
mobilizations.  However, the negative impacts on continuation were found to decrease or 
become statistically insignificant for those who enlisted after 9/11.  Shorter mobilization 
durations were found to positively impact continuation rates. 
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This thesis investigates the probability of Marine Corps reservists continuing 
service in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) drilling units an additional year 
after completing their initial contractual obligation of 6 years.  Unlike prior attrition 
studies, this thesis does not intend to investigate early attrition that occurs during an 
individual’s 72-month contract, but rather focuses on the decision point at which a 
reservist has satisfactorily completed the initial obligated service.  These individuals are 
not contractually bound to continue drilling and may leave the SMCR drilling units at any 
time.  The population of interest will be non-prior service (NPS)1 reserve enlisted 
personnel.  More specifically, those NPS enlisted personnel will be examined who have 
served on their initial contract of obligated service where they are required to drill with 
reserve units for 6 years, and then serve in the Ready Reserve2 for 2 years.  These 
contracts are commonly referred to as 6x2 Contracts, and although there are other term 
contracts associated with NPS personnel, the 6x2 Contract is the most prevalent, 
encompassing roughly 98% of the total SMCR NPS population (MCO 100R.1K, 2009, 
March).   
The primary goal of this thesis will be to identify the effects of mobilization3 and 
its influence on Marine Corps Reserve NPS personnel continuation rates.  As numerous 
previous reserve studies indicate, Post-9/11 mobilizations have placed an increased 
                                                 
1 Non-prior Service (NPS) personnel are contracted to serve in the Ready Reserve for an initial 8 years 
of Military Service Obligation (MSO). Simply put, they are those reservists who have never before served 
in the military.  There are four different types of contracts, which all total to an 8-year obligation.  The 
majority of these NPS accessions serve under 6x2 contracts, as explained above. 
2 Ready Reserve  obligation refers to the period of time in which Marines still have time remaining on 
their total  MSO but are not required to participate in monthly drills, except to muster no more than once a 
year.  This period provides for a pool of pre-trained manpower which can be mobilized during national 
emergency or war.  
3 Mobilization refers to the activation of a reservist for the purpose of directly supporting a military 
contingency operation.  In the case of NPS reservists, an SMCR unit is mobilized to support the operation 
and therefore most mobilizations which are involuntary in nature include NPS personnel. 
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burden on our reserve forces.  Understanding how this increased burden has affected 
reservists may provide helpful insight for Marine manpower planners to consider when 
shaping the future reserve force.  Additionally, important attention should be focused on 
whether reservists’ expectations toward mobilization have been affected in such as way 
that they are closely correlated with continuation rates during different time periods, Pre-
9/11 and Post-9/11. 
Mobilization effects will be tested by using multivariate analysis to isolate the 
effects of individual categorical variables on the likelihood of continuing service 1 year 
beyond their completed obligation.  Independent variables such as demographics, military 
performance, education benefits, unit type, geographic location, and unemployment rates 
will be utilized. 
B. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
There are currently no previous studies specifically examining Reserve NPS 
continuation rates within the Marine Corps.  The results of this study will be beneficial to 
manpower planners in several ways.  First, the training costs from losing too many 
reservists due to attrition and retention is of vital interest, especially given the climate of 
fiscal austerity amidst unprecedented congressional budget deficits.  During Fiscal Year 
2010, the Marine Corps spent $123 million in reserve training.  This exceeded their initial 
annual appropriation for reserve training by 28%.  Much of this elevated training cost is 
traceable to high attrition and loss rates within the reserve force.  Therefore, determining 
the issues surrounding continuation behavior of NPS personnel is a high priority for 
manpower planners.  Second, this study will help assist in the development of future 
SMCR end strength models, by identifying predictors and estimating their effects on the 
probability of continuation.  Third, the data will help manpower planners in developing 
more accurate reserve recruiting goals and accessions in order to assist in the 
development of the Marine Corps first ever “Reserve Continuation Mission” for Fiscal 
Year 2012. Lastly, by examining the various models presented within this thesis, 
manpower planners can utilize pertinent continuation probabilities that occur during 
specific time periods of intense utilization, such as during operations in Iraq and 
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Afghanistan, as well as the probabilities of continuing service during more moderate or 
minimal utilization periods, such as periods prior to September 11, 2001.  These findings 
hope to ultimately provide an enhanced understanding of reserve continuation rate 
behavior.  Enough specificity will be given to assist in developing future incentive and 
other reserve policies aimed at minimizing future unnecessary reserve losses and 
excessive training costs while continuing to utilize the Marine Corps Reserve as an 
operational force for the foreseeable future. 
C. BACKGROUND 
1. Increased Utilization of the Marine Corps Reserves 
During the last 20 years, the increased utilization of the Reserves in support of 
both military contingency operations and humanitarian assistance has marked the 
conclusion to the longstanding previous “strategic posture” of the Reserves.  In particular, 
since September 11, 2001, to current day operations, the Reserves share an increased 
portion of the nation’s operational strain sustained by both the Iraq and Afghanistan 
conflicts.   
Specific to the Marine Corps Reserve, deployments spiked for the SMCR in the 
post-9/11 era and reached a peak just after the commencement of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) in April of 2003.  Figure 1 depicts the Marine Corps Selected Reserve 
(SelRes) activation4 patterns from September 2001 to September 2009.  These figures 
represent total numbers of SelRes personnel who were serving on active duty in support 
of a contingency operation at any given time during these periods.   
 
                                                 
4 Activation refers to the period of time when the reservist’s part-time reserve status transitions to 
active duty for a specified period of time.  Activations can either be involuntarily or voluntary.  The 
preponderance of activations usually arises from involuntary unit activations in support of various combat 
operations or humanitarian related operations.  The term mobilization is often used synonymously with 
activation, but in technical terms is limited to involuntary activation. 
 4
 
Figure 1.   Post-9/11 Frequency of SelRes Activations 
On average, there were 6,927 SelRes Marines per month serving on activation 
orders from September 2001 to September 2009, with this number peaking at 17,807 in 
April of 2003 just after OIF.  The operational contributions made by Marine Corps 
reservists have been essential to maintaining the intense operational demand required to 
sustain two major conflicts simultaneously.  Their role has proven to be so valuable that 
the Secretary of Defense called for the reserve components of each of the services to be 
managed as “operational forces” and integrated into each service’s operational planning.5  
Only time will tell how these increased demands and this new operational posture will 
affect reserve retention and attrition behavior (DoD Directive 1200.17, 2008, October). 
 
                                                 
5 Department of Defense Directive 1200.17 is a new initiative prompted to ensure reserve forces are to 
provide both operational capabilities and strategic depth in order to meet U.S. defense requirements across 
the full spectrum of conflict.  It is aimed to synergize efforts from a more “total force perspective” and 
utilize reserve forces in a manner which increases the overall effectiveness of force planning and execution. 
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2. Current Trends in NPS Continuation Rates 
The largest segment of the Marine Corps Reserve likely to be affected by this 
increased utilization is the NPS population.  Since virtually all NPS reservists drill with 
SMCR units, they are the most susceptible to involuntary activation and mobilization.  
Current data indicates that NPS reservists average less than 50% attrition over the life of 
their 6-year drilling obligated contract.  Of those who complete their 72-month contracts, 
81% do not continue service for an additional period of at least 12 months beyond their 
completed Mandatory Drill Participation Stop Date (MDPSD).6  The scope of this thesis 
will not cover the former attrition problem, but rather will focus attention toward the 
latter continuation problem associated with those who choose not to serve beyond their 
initial obligations.  This problem is depicted in Figure 2.  Notice the drastic decline in the 
cumulative continuation survival rate at the 72-month mark and beyond.  This area will 
be commonly referred to as the “Waterfall” throughout this thesis (see Methodology, 
Chapter V).  This period warrants further investigation to determine the various factors 
associated with this decline. 
                                                 
6 Mandatory Drill Participation Stop Date (MDPSD) refers to the period of time that the service 
member has met their mandatory drilling obligation with an SMCR unit.  This period falls within their total 
Military Service Obligation (MSO) which encompasses the service member’s required drilling obligation, 
as well as, their total required Ready Reserve time.  For example, in the case of a NPS reservist serving on 
a 6x2 contract, the 6 years represent the mandatory drill participation time while the 2 years are 
encompassed within their total MSO.  
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Source: Marine Corps Reserve Retention Brief presented in New Orleans, LA on 
July, 21, 2010 Author:  M&RA, Quantico, VA. 
Figure 2.   NPS Continuation Behavior Graph 
In prior research on active duty and reserve attrition and retention studies, the 
focus has been primarily on whether the service members remain until the end of their 
obligated contract or if they choose to be retained past their initial contract.  This 
approach, however, does not take into consideration the unrestrictive nature of reserve 
contracts.   
Reservists’ movement in and out of drilling service once they complete their 
initial obligation is much less restrictive than the active component and can often be 
intermittent during the months following their completed SelRes obligation when they 
are technically no longer required to report to drill duty.  Even if they formally reenlist, 
there is nothing binding them to continue to serve.  Furthermore, if they have received a 
reenlistment bonus to continue service and chose not to continue, all that is required from 
them is to pay back their reenlistment bonus to the government.  Beginning in Fiscal Year 
2011, individuals accepting reenlistment bonuses will be subject to administrative 
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separation from the Marine Corps; however this policy change will apply to less than 3% 
of the population due to the limited nature of reenlistment bonuses in the Marine Corps 
Reserve.  Consequently, given this unique dynamic, standard retention studies do not 
ultimately capture a person’s probability of continuing service beyond his/her initial 
drilling obligated period of service. 
3. Importance of Retaining NPS Reservists 
As previously mentioned in the benefits of this study, Marine Corps Reserve 
training costs currently exceed the annual allocated budget.  Much of this problem may 
be attributed to an excessive number of NPS reservists who do not continue serving 
beyond their Military Service Obligations (MSO)7 and leave more senior leadership 
positions vacant.  The problem is two-fold: not only are those positions required to be 
filled via new accessions, but also those vacancies leave units with those of lower rank 
and experience to fill critical leadership positions.  This potentially could have spillover 
effects in terms of unit cohesion, readiness, and morale, which adds more complexity to 
the current retention issues. 
Fundamentally, this non-continuation rate phenomenon could potentially 
jeopardize the overall long-term size and health of the senior leadership population.  For 
example, many Marines who choose not to continue drilling potentially represent a large 
portion of the high quality Marines that would be beneficial for the Marine Corps to 
retain.  This would directly impact the Marine Corps’ ability to grow its senior leadership 
in the ranks of Staff Sergeants, Gunnery Sergeants, First Sergeants and Master Sergeants. 
4. USMC Design Paradigm 
Historically, the Marine Corps is a fighting force that has concentrated its 
manpower in the junior enlisted and officer grades resulting in a vibrant ‘young warrior’ 
                                                 
7 Military Service Obligation (MSO) refers to the mandatory obligated service period required for each 
service member.  All service members who are inducted into the Armed Forces after June 1, 1984, incur an 
8-year total obligation period.  Not to be confused with the Mandatory Drill Participation Stop Date 
(MDPSD), this only refers to the period of time in which the service member is required to drill with their 
unit. 
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mentality. Manpower planning, by design, accounts for a preponderance of first term 
enlistees leaving service after completing an initial enlistment contract, and provides for a 
high ratio of junior subordinate Marines to senior leaders.  By doing this, it helps 
maintain correct grade distributions throughout the Marine Corps.  In addition, Title 10 of 
the United States Code provides legislative limitations on grade strengths and imposes 
years of service limitations by rank for the active and reserve components, establishing 
the up-or-out system (Title 10, U.S.C., §413). For these reasons, this manpower structure 
is not designed to retain the majority of Marines.  Thus, the force structure only provides 
boat spaces for approximately 25% of the population of those highly qualified individuals 
to be reenlisted and promoted.  The same considerations apply to the reserve model.  One 
control measure that currently exists within the Marine Corps is called the Enlisted 
Career Force Control (ECFC) Program.  According to the Marine Corps administrative 
message titled, “MARADMIN 505/10” (2009), in order to assist in the effective shaping 
of the force by grade and MOS, the Marine Corps has set the following Time in Service 
(TIS)8 promotion targets: 
Sergeant (Sgt)        4      Years 
Staff Sergeant  (SSgt)       8.5   Years 
Gunnery Sergeant (GySgt)      13    Years 
First Sergeant/Master Sergeant (1stSgt/MSgt)   17.5 Years 
Sergeant Major/Master Gunnery Sergeant (SgtMaj/MGySgt) 22    Years 
 
Since these promotion selections are based on PMOS, those who are selected to 
the rank of Corporal and above, are promoted on the basis that they will meet the specific 
needs of the Marine Corps and further ensure that the skills of these individual Marines 
who are promoted are consistent with the vacancies in the force.  In addition, enlisted 
grade structure reviews are conducted that ensure Marines are promoting at the TIS 
targets for each grade and that each PMOS is promoted on a pyramid–based structure.  
PMOS occupational field sponsors, Manpower and Reserve Affairs analysts, and the 
                                                 
8 Time in Service (TIS) refers to the amount of time in years/months that the service member has spent 
in military service.  Conversely, Time in Grade (TIG) refers to the amount of time in years/months that the 
service member has spent in his current rank or grade. 
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Total Force Structure Division are charged with ensuring that the ever adjusting structure 
of the table of organization does not adversely affect the grade shape of respective 
PMOSs.  The ultimate goal behind the ECFC Program is to balance the total inventory of 
Marines by grade and MOS to meet career force requirements.  Continued 
implementation of these force management strategies ensures that commanders are 
provided with the right Marines by grade and MOS (MARADMIN, 505/10, 2009). 
With this design background understood, in keeping with the best interest to the 
institution as a whole, it is apparent that the Marine Corps does not necessarily need or 
want everyone to be retained.  However, Reserve manpower planners must be 
particularly precise when projecting continuation due to the specific complexities of 
nonrigid contracts and systematically different continuation behavior amongst reservists.  
It takes time to grow reserve Staff Sergeants and Gunnery Sergeants, etc.  The Marine 
Corps needs to target those specific reservists who are the best candidates to grow and 
sustain a high-quality force and potentially adjust monetary incentives as a strategy to 
retain them.  Due to limited funding, there is no effective monetary incentive plan that 
targets the necessary reserve population to continue service beyond their initial 
contractual obligation of 6 years.  Therefore, close examination of continuation behavior 
of NPS 6x2 contracts is needed to inform the budget process. 
5. Reserve Expectations 
It is important to highlight that the fundamental premise surrounding the human 
decision-making process is that it relies heavily on individuals’ expectations.  Critical 
examination of reserve behavior with this in mind is both relevant and necessary.  As 
Dolfini-Reed et al. (2005) point out, the expectations of individual reservists with respect 
to how much they will be mobilized in support of military operations play a unique role 
in their decision making.  Therefore, when examining related behavioral patterns of 
Marine Reservists, one cannot simply compare reserve decisions with how the active-
component makes decisions.  By realizing the reserve population has systemic individual 
characteristics that are inherently different from the active component, it is fair to make 
the assumption that reservists have different expectations than those of active component 
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personnel, especially during certain time periods.  Previous research conducted by CNA 
involving comprehensive reserve attrition across all services found that during the post-
9/11 time periods, Marine Corps Reserve loss rates were higher than during periods prior 
to 9/11 (Dolfini-Reed et al., 2005). 
Additionally, by examining loss rates over time, personnel inventory snapshots 
revealed that loss rates for recently deactivated9 reservists were higher than for those 
reservists who never activated.  Over time, the “never activated” and “activated” groups 
began to follow the same trends, suggesting there was an initial reaction to the 
presidential call up of the reserves.  Once this reaction diminished, reservists may have 
adjusted their expectations regarding their likelihood of activation, and therefore loss 
rates began to decline in both “the activated” and “never activated” groups. Even more 
interesting were those reservists who activated for 6 months or fewer and never were 
deployed overseas; they had higher loss rates than those who were activated and 
deployed (Dolfini-Reed et al., 2005).  Reservists may be more likely to leave if they are 
disillusioned with the system. This lends credence to possible cultural factors associated 
with Marine Corps service, as well as how the “type of deployment” is perceived by the 
individual reservist as compared to their expectation of deploying or not deploying. 
Studies by Dolfini-Reed and McHugh (2007) examined specific reserve 
component groups within the Marine Corps Reserve using both descriptive statistics and 
survival analysis.  The results yielded similar results involving expectations with even 
more granularity.  Deployment length seemed to be correlated with loss rates.  Since 
September 11, 2001, 86% of those activated served 12 months or fewer, which was and 
still is currently the norm for involuntarily activated or mobilized SMCR units.  Dolfini-
Reed’s and McHugh’s findings indicated that those activations exceeding the 8–12 month 
period resulted in higher loss rates and most likely were related to expectations of the 
actual deployment length.  When activations deviate from expectations, they result in 
                                                 
9 Deactivated refers to the period of time when a reservist returns to a normal reserve status after 
having just been either voluntary or involuntary activated in support of military operations.  In the case of 
NPS reservists, this deactivation usually occurs with entire SMCR units which have just returned to 
CONUS. 
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higher loss rates.  This marks a unique and relevant distinction with reservists’ 
expectations of deployment and actual deployment experiences. 
Lastly, given the unique dynamic of reservists juggling a full-time civilian job in 
addition to their reserve duty obligation, reservists self-select into continued service by 
weighing their taste for the job, along with time they are willing to spend towards their 
reserve duty obligations above and beyond their current full-time civilian careers.  These 
factors can arguably differ in their weight on reservists versus those serving in the active 
duty forces.  Thus, Figure 3 outlines the hypothesized expectations of a reservist based on 
the likelihood that he/she may be mobilized during the following three periods:  Pre-9/11, 
Overlap-9/11, and Post-9/11.   
The Pre-9/11 period isolates the years for those NPS reservists who enlisted 
during FY 1992–1995 and reached the 6-year decision point to continue service during 
FY 1998–2001, at the conclusion of their contracts.  The Overlap-9/11 period isolates the 
years of those NPS reservists who enlisted during FY 1996–2001 and reached the 
decision point to continue service between FY 2002–2007.  The Post-9/11 period will 
capture the years of those NPS reservists who enlisted during FY 2002–2003 and reached 
the decision point to continue service between FY 2008–2009.  Throughout this thesis, 
these three groups are the basis for the statistical analysis used to further examine the 





Figure 3.   Hypothesized Expectation Periods 
D. RESERVE ORGANIZATION AND FORCE STRUCTURE 
The mission of the Marine Corps Reserve is to augment and reinforce the active 
component with both qualified individuals and trained units during a time of national 
emergency, war, or when the nation’s national security is at risk (MCO 1001R.1K, 2009, 
March). 
By design, the Marine Corps Reserve not only compliments the total operating 
force structure and capabilities of the active component, but also carries the burden of 
being able to rapidly deploy and sustain at any level of recall or mobilization.  This “total 
force integration,” is the token theme for all reserve planning, training, and 
administration (MCO 1001R.1K, 2009, March). General Michael W. Hagee, the 33rd 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, summarized this theme in a speech given on April 6, 
2004, to Marines deployed in Al Asad, Iraq: 
All of the Marines have performed magnificently—both active and 
reserve, I can’t tell the difference between an active duty and a Reserve 
unit out here which speaks highly of the Reserve units we have operating 
in our different areas of responsibility. The reserve Marines have 
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performed as outstandingly through OIF II as they did through OIF I. We, 
the Marine Corps, could not do what we do without them. 
As depicted in Figure 4, The Marine Corps Reserve is categorized into three 
major components: the Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. 
 
 
 Source: MCO 1001R.1K, 2009, March 
Figure 4.   Components of the Marine Corps Reserve 
1. Ready Reserve 
The Ready Reserve is comprised of the Selected Reserve (SelRes) and the 
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and is organized to serve as the nation’s crisis 
contingency during times of war or national emergency (MCO 1001R.1K, 2009, March). 
 14
a. Selected Reserve (SelRes) 
The SelRes consists of the Active Reserve (AR), Selected Marine Corps 
Reserve (SMCR) units, Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), and Marines 
undergoing Initial Active Duty for Training (IADT).  Generally speaking, other than the 
AR, who serve full-time in jobs that support the overall reserve mission and integration 
of the Total Force and those Marines undergoing IADT, the SelRes members primarily 
consist of part-time drilling reservists.  Most reservists fall into the category of SMCR 
units in which they serve by drilling one weekend out of the month and two weeks out of 
the year.  IMAs are reservists who volunteer to augment specific active-duty job 
vacancies, which need to be filled in support of mobilization for either combat military 
operations or training roles (MCO 1001R.1K, 2009, March).  The focus of this thesis is 
limited to NPS Marines in the SMCR units. 
b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) 
The IRR is comprised of those Marines who still have time remaining on 
their total Military Service Obligations (MSO) or have enlisted in the Ready Reserve, but 
are not required to participate in monthly drills, except to muster once a year.  For 
example, if a reservist is serving on a MSO of eight years with a 6x2 contract, the first six 
years he/she is required to drill with SMCR units once a month and two weeks out of the 
year.  However, at the completion of his/her 6-year drilling obligation, they can choose to 
drop to the IRR where they complete the remainder of their two years of MSO by only 
being required to muster up to once annually.  They are not required to drill with a unit 
during this IRR period.  This category primarily exists to provide a pre-trained pool of 
manpower available in the case of a presidential call up where members of the IRR can 
be easily recalled to service during this period if necessary.  By comparison, in the active 
component, most first time enlisted contracts are 4x4 contracts, where the service 
member’s first 4 years requires them to serve in an active duty capacity.  At the end of 
their 4 years, unless they reenlist for another term, they would fall into their IRR period 
for 4 years where they would not be required to serve unless recalled in support of a 
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wartime or national emergency (MCO 1001R.1K, 2009, March).  Marines who reenlist 
and choose not to continue drilling also fall into this category. 
2. Standby Reserve 
The Standby Reserve consists of reservists who are not a part of either the Ready 
or Retired Reserve and are unable or choose not to participate regularly.  They are 
reservists who also fall subject to recall to active duty during time of war or national 
emergency, but at a lower cost of readiness and lower priority for mobilization.  The 
Active Status List (ASL) of the Standby Reserve is primarily those reservists who have 
been unable to participate in the reserves on a regular basis due to civilian employment 
hardship or other personal issues.  Members of the ASL still remain eligible for 
promotion and must complete their annual reserve point requirements in order to be 
retained in an active status, but are not eligible to receive monetary compensation.  They 
are not required to train and are not members of units; however, they may be mobilized 
as needed to fill manpower requirements for specific skills. 
The Standby Reserve Inactive Status List (ISL) consists solely of officers who 
have met their requirements of service obligation but failed to meet their minimum 
annual participation point requirements, and desire to remain affiliated with the Reserves 
or fail to respond to annual correspondence requirements. Reservists in the ISL are not 
eligible to receive pay, promotion, or retirement benefits (MCO 1001R.1K, 2009, 
March). Both the ASL and the ISL categories are not relevant to this study. 
3. Retired Reserves 
The retired reserves consists of those Marines who have either requested or been 
approved for retirement.  This reserve category is not relevant to this study.  
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E. NONPRIOR SERVICE POPULATION 
1. Accession Avenues 
To further enrich the understanding of NPS characteristics, it is important to 
highlight the specific pathways that NPS reservists can take upon entering service into 
the Marine Corps.  All NPS accessions may be categorized under one of four distinct 
Reserve Optional Enlistment Programs (ROEP)10 and the Reserve Incremental Initial 
Active Duty for Training (IIADT)11 program.  
a. Reserve Optional Enlistment Programs 
There are four enlistment obligation options whereby all NPS accessions 
are contracted to serve in the Ready Reserve for an initial 8-year contract.  Table 1 
describes type and service requirements for each ROEP contract.  As Table 2 outlines, the 
vast majority of these NPS accession requirements are fulfilled by 6x2 contracts.  These 
6x2 contracts comprise over 97% of the ROEP population and remain consistent in their 
representation over time. 
Table 1.   Reserve Optional Enlistment Program Contract Type 
 
  Source: Author 
                                                 
10 Reserve Optional Enlistment Program (ROEP) closely parallels the active duty enlistment options 
where an active duty recruit enters into service on similar contracts except in a full time duty capacity.  The 
most prevalent first term active duty enlistment contract is a 4x4 contract, whereas the most prevalent NPS 
reserve contract under the ROEP is a 6x2 contract. 
11 Incremental Initial Duty Training Period (IIADT) is a contract option available to a reservist upon 
accession where he/she may complete the required training periods incrementally for boot camp and their 
follow-on occupation school; also referred to as “Split-I Training.”  This is ultimately intended to help 
those reservists who have possible school- or employer-related constraints which require them to minimize 
the length of time they are away to train early in their contracts.  
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Table 2.   Reserve Optional Enlistment Program Distributions (2000–2010) 
 
 Source: Author, TFDW Data 
To further illustrate the specific flow and path of those NPS reservists 
serving on 6x2 contracts, Figure 5 represents a graphical depiction of the typical 
accession path for an ROEP recruit.  Notice that all IADT training is completed in 




Figure 5.   NPS Reserve Optional Enlistment Program Flowchart 
b. Reserve Incremental Initial Active Duty for Training (IIADT) 
Program 
This program is specifically designed to target those who plan to enroll in 
college or currently are enrolled in college.  It is designed to minimize the length of time 
that the reservist spends away from home at each stage of their initial training period and 
to further assist in balancing civilian commitments.  Figure 6 represents the process of an 
NPS IIADT recruit.  Typically, those qualified IIADT recruits will enter boot camp for 
their initial training shortly after high school graduation.  Upon successful completion, 
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they return home to attend their first semester of college, unlike the normal ROEP 
enlistment in which recruits continue on directly to Marine Combat Training (MCT)12  
IIADT recruits, however, return home without attending MCT or the School of Infantry 
(SOI) right away.  Throughout their first college school year, IIADT reservists are 
required to drill with their unit until the next summer break, when they attend MCT 
and/or Military Occupational School (MOS).  In rare instances, the training pipeline 
occurs over three separate summers.  While, commonly referred to as “Split-I Training” 
or “92-Day Reservists,” they only comprise less than 7% of all NPS reservist accessions. 
 
 
         Source: Author  
Figure 6.   Incremental Initial Active Duty Training Period Flowchart 
                                                 
12 Marine Combat Training (MCT) is a month long school required for all graduating boot camp 
recruits regardless of military occupational specialty.  This school is designed to offer each individual 
Marine exposure, knowledge, and the ability to operate as a Marine Rifleman in a combat environment; 
hence, supporting the culture of “Every Marine a Rifleman.” 
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2. Exit Paths for NPS Reservists 
NPS personnel have several choices that are available upon the completion of 
their mandatory drill participation period with their units.  As Figure 7 indicates, there are 
several choices available for the NPS reservist.   
 
 
          Source: Author 
Figure 7.   NPS Exit Options Flowchart 
It is important to note that not all exit options result in a loss for the SelRes.  
Specifically, those NPS reservists who choose the following paths do not result in a loss: 
the Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program, Inter-Unit Transfers (IUT), 
Active Reserve (AR), and those deciding to enter one of the Marine Corps Officer 
Programs.  However, those NPS reservists who drop to the IRR and exit to other service 
transfers are considered a loss.  Both current data trends, as well as previous research on 
NPS behavior patterns, suggest that most of the losses occur to the IRR.  Conversely, 
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understanding these exit options that are available to the NPS reservists help provide the 
depth needed for later analysis of those reservists who chose to continue service. 
F. RESEARCH SCOPE  
In contrast to most previous reserve-focused studies, which primarily analyze 
mainstream defense topics centered around attrition and retention, this thesis examines 
the effects of mobilization/deployment on the likelihood of continuing service 12 months 
beyond the 6-year drilling requirement.  Considering that only 19% of the NPS 
population continues beyond this point, it has been identified by Marine Corps 
Manpower Planners as a priority for analysis and considered a necessity for successful 
shaping of the future reserve force. A more detailed discussion surrounding this 
methodology will be provided in Chapter V. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis contains ten chapters in order to characterize the effects of 
mobilizations on NPS continuation rates.  Together, Chapters II–IV provide thorough 
empirical research background within the literature review, theoretical model discussion, 
and social and psychological factors, which will establish the framework for analysis. 
Collectively, Chapters V–VII define the data specifics, variable description, and 
descriptive statistics, which includes the preliminary research analysis for this thesis.  
Details within these chapters provide additional basis for model specification and 
multivariate regressions. 
Chapters VIII–IX describe the statistical models and presents multivariate 
regression results.  Statistical models will provide the explicit description for the various 
models utilized for regression analysis.  The multivariate regression results chapter 
outlines the detailed results for each model used in the study. Lastly, Chapter X provides 
conclusions for this thesis and recommendations for future study.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The preponderance of research regarding retention and attrition has been among 
studies that focused on the active component.  However, there have been relatively few 
studies focusing on the reserves.  Over the past decade, the main focus of reserve studies 
has centered on reserve intentions, attrition, and retention, but few have examined the 
actual drivers of reserve continuation behavior.  Mainly, the federally funded research 
and development centers such as RAND Corporation and the Center for Naval Analyses 
(CNA) have produced the most substantial and comprehensive studies examining 
relevant and vital reserve topics. 
The goal of this literature review is to examine more recent and relevant reserve 
attrition and retention studies, in order to further develop a theoretical basis for 
constructing a valid conceptual multivariate framework that assesses Marine Corps 
Reserve (MCR) continuation behavior.  
1. Attrition 
Attrition is defined as the separation of service prior to the completion of agreed 
upon contracted terms of military service.  Within the military spectrum, first-term 
attrition has been studied significantly to further understand the specific and relevant time 
periods in which significant losses occur.  Specifically, attrition is examined during initial 
training and occupational specialty schools, as well as throughout a person’s obligated 
contract. 
Defining attrition within the MCR is more challenging than analyzing attrition of 
the active component.  This is due to the wide variety of service contracts available for 
Marine reservists.  Initial drilling obligations range from 3 years to 6 years, while 
reenlistment contracts only obligate Marines to serve anywhere within the Ready Reserve 
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instead of SMCR units or the SelRes13.  Additionally, some reservists complete their 
initial training requirements at a later time, as previously outlined in Chapter I Section E 
Reserve Overview for ROEP and IIADT.  Furthermore, an individual loss within the 
SMCR does not always constitute a loss for the MCR since the reservist may transfer 
from one reserve participation category to another.  These nuances that exist within the 
reserve community must be closely considered when analyzing various studies of 
attrition (Price, 2010). 
2. Retention 
Retention is defined as the voluntary decision of a person who has completed 
their initial obligation of service and chooses to remain in the military for additional term 
of service.  Marine Corps Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) sets annual retention 
missions for the active component in Memorandum-01 (Memo-01) based on the 
percentage of Marines who reenlist at the end of their first and subsequent terms, more 
commonly referred to as alignment plans.  These plans are formally known as the First 
Term Alignment Plan (FTAP)14 for the initial term, and the subsequent term alignment 
plan (STAP)15 for each additional term.  Retention can be difficult to measure in the 
active component because not all Marines reenlist; rather, some extend for certain periods 
of time without formally signing a reenlistment contract.   
For the MCR, manpower planners must examine retention through a different lens 
due to the nature of their unrestricted types of contracts. In general, Marines who reenlist 
in the reserves are only obligated to serve in the Ready Reserve (including both the 
                                                 
13 Beginning in the Fiscal Year 2011, M&RA has initiated a pilot program where up to 500 Marines 
will be given an incentive to contractually obligate themselves for an additional three-year period in the 
SMCR units after successfully completing their initial service obligation in the Selected Reserve or active 
component.  Analysis of this program will not be complete prior to Fiscal Year 2014. 
14 First Term Alignment Program (FTAP) is a retention program used by the Marine Corps which 
assists in the reenlistment of first term enlistees, by PMOS or via lateral move.  It attempts to balance 
manpower staffing strengths by the vacancies of departing careerists and fill the spaces appropriately with 
those who are qualified to reenlist.  
15 Subsequent Term Alignment Program (STAP) is intended to complement the FTAP by balancing 
the promotion pyramid in subsequent terms while reducing the overall FTAP requirement.  It is designed to 
proactively target and reenlist career Marines by PMOS. Its purpose is ultimately to improve the retention 
of career force Marines while closely aligning promotion tempos across all PMOSs. 
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SelRes and IRR).  Specific to NPS Marine Reservists, they can choose to stop drilling 
altogether at the completion of their 6-year drilling obligation, or can drill on a month-to-
month basis after the completion of their 6-year drilling obligation while still 
contractually obligated to remain in the Ready Reserve.  This unrestrictive and fluid non-
contractual period further complicates the standard approaches to retention. A new tool 
designed to help manage this problem is a program similar to FTAP called the Obligor 
Alignment Program (OAP),16 which is tentatively scheduled for implementation during 
FY 2012. 
B. ATTRITION STUDIES 
1. Deployment Post-9/11 
Dolfini-Reed et al. (2005) examined reserve attrition (all six reserve components 
of the armed forces) that has occurred since September 11, 2001 by using descriptive 
statistics analysis techniques.  They developed a database that determined the number of 
completed and current activations for each reserve component by length and active duty 
period.  A few years later, updated evidence by Dolfini-Reed et al. (2005), as reported in 
Chapter 4 of Winkler and Bicksler’s (2008) book on the guard and reserves, identified 
that, as of June 2007, approximately 393,000 enlisted reservists had completed at least 
one active duty period in support of Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  This population accounted for over half of the total eligible population of 
reserve enlisted personnel that potentially could have been activated under the ongoing 
mobilizations since 9/11.  This highlights the fact that enlisted members make up the 
preponderance of reserve mobilizations and that deployment magnitude and type are 
relevant when investigating reserve attrition. 
Their approach involved calculating loss rates by looking 6 months past each 
reservists’ deactivation month to see if that person still remains in the population, 
                                                 
16 Obligor Alignment Program (OAP) a new reserve alignment program designed similar to the FTAP 
for the active component.  It attempts to balance the inventory of SMCR Marines by grade and MOS based 
on the needs of the Marine Corps.  The OAP identifies the number of first-term Marines by PMOS that the 
Marine Corps must retain in order to achieve the requirements of the career force in each Reserve battalion. 
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signifying that they are still serving in the reserves.  One limitation, which the authors 
point out, is that they were unable to test loss rates for those who were currently on 
activation status because those individuals do not have the choice of exiting service 
voluntarily.  This will later become an important consideration in constructing the 
statistical model for this thesis on NPS continuation rates.   
Dolfini-Reed et al. (2005) considered the individual’s experiences during the 
period of activation, such as: (1) did the service member deploy overseas, (2) did he/she 
activate and not deploy overseas, or (3) did the person activate at all. Of the activated 
population, those who deployed overseas had a lower loss rate than those who were 
activated but stayed in CONUS. Also, the length of activation was important, with higher 
losses seen for those with longer periods of activation. Interestingly, multiple 
deployments seem to have no effect on reservist loss rates. 
Specifically, MCR members had the highest 6-month loss rates of all the services, 
which increased significantly with the length of active duty period. This effect was even 
more pronounced in MCR members who were activated but never deployed. 
An interesting conclusion can be drawn from these results.  As mentioned in the 
background, Reservists’ expectations of deploying and the type of deployment are 
particularly relevant when analyzing actual behavior; especially in the reserves, where 
service often comes second to their primary civilian occupations as a means of obtaining 
income. 
Furthermore, deployment type, deployment experience, and the organizational 
culture of the specific service are all important factors to take into consideration.  These 
are very difficult to infer from previous statistical driven studies, but by considering 
specific service attributes and missions, along with culture, they may provide a relevant 
lens for further analysis.  Perhaps the rigor, deployment experience, and career 
expectations for Marines is vastly different from other services, which have different 
overall military missions. 
Lastly, this analysis provided interesting reserve statistics across the Department 
of Defense, which revealed that overall loss rates of today are higher than Pre-9/11 
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period. However, there are differences in the loss rates within subpopulations of 
reservists and these are highly correlated with deployment status.  One goal of this thesis 
is to reduce the specific noise associated with grouping all the Ready Reserve categories 
into a single population by exclusively examining retention behavior for NPS Marine 
personnel, while also restricting the data to Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 periods. 
2. Total Force Perspective 
Attrition is an ever-present problem for both active and reserve component. 
Especially for the reserves, the attrition rate is known to be extremely high, which raises 
concerns for training losses.  However, in the study by Sheila Nataraj Kirby and David 
W. Grissmer (1993), they take a closer look at reserve attrition during FY82 to FY88 and 
discover that as many as two-thirds of reservists who attrite, in fact come back to service 
or transfer to the active component or other active duty programs. They believe that 
attrition within the reserve forces should be analyzed with a “total force perspective,” 
where there is a lot of lateral movement (movement to the IRR or within different reserve 
service categories), which cannot be considered attrition and where training costs are not 
truly lost. The only real loss is when trained personnel permanently depart for full 
civilian life. 
During the fiscal years analyzed from 1982–1988, the Marine Corps Reserve had 
the highest permanent reserve loss (35%) but this was still lower than the overall attrition 
of 60%, showing that 25% of reservists returned to service (same component, other 
selected reserve service, or active duty).  The most important conclusions of their study 
were that a better measure for return on investment of training for a reservist will be their 
total participating years of service, instead of looking at their first break in service as a 
final attrition metric.  Also, although true attrition (or loss to civilian life) rates may be 
lower than previously recognized, this still points to a problem of disorderly flow (in and 
out of service) where we could still be losing effectiveness and readiness within the 
reserve forces. Although this study is dated and examines a population of reservists 
serving in the 1980s, it marks a cornerstone in research design as it pertains to the 
reserves.   
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Similar implications were made in a recent study by Dolfini-Reed and Bowling, 
(2010) on their analysis of MCR recruiting and retention processes and policies.  In this 
study, the authors suggested that the Marine Corps expand on its already existing total 
force perspective and utilize data mechanisms to identify specific demographic 
characteristics and relocation patterns of transitioning active component Marines.  This 
information would provide manpower analysts with a more comprehensive understanding 
of the actual exit flow of active component Marines transitioning by rank, MOS, and 
geographic region to better inform the overall recruiting process.  Perhaps, a portion of 
the active component mission could align with local Reserve unit MOS needs at the 
recruiting station.  Similarly, this total force approach can be used for NPS Marines.  
Understanding the numerous characteristics of those who decide to stay or leave helps 
arm the overall recruiting mission with valuable information to help target key 
geographic regions and certain demographic populations near reserve stations and helps 
make the complex task of forecasting reserve accession more manageable.   
This thesis will provide an extension of the total force perspective by identifying 
actual NPS behavior over the previous 15-year period.  This thesis hopes to help 
manpower analysts synergize the Marine Corps overall reserve recruiting process.  
3. Incentive Programs 
Reservists are a unique group of military servicemembers, which requires a more 
in-depth approach when investigating their service behavior.  Understanding the 
intricacies of how their professional civilian careers may affect their volunteer military 
service is of vital concern.  In the volatile national security environment of today, 
reservists have proven to be an indispensable asset to our military, able to quickly 
augment the active component when needed.  But how to best attract high-quality 
individuals and retain them within the reserve force has been a major concern.  A study 
by Hattiangadi, et al. (2006) looked at a group of Marine Corps Reserve monetary 
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incentives categorized together under the Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP)17 
and found that these are valuable tools when it comes to retaining and recruiting quality 
individuals. 
When incentives such as bonuses (enlistment or reenlistment) are given, 
Hattiangadi et al. (2006) found that reservists are less likely to attrite, possibly due to 
their obligation to return the bonus if the service is not completed or perhaps because 
these people had a higher sense of obligation before taking the bonus.  In the Marine 
Corps Reserve before 9/11, only about 1% of 6-year obligors18 were given bonuses and 
this only increased to 2.5% after 9/11.  For Fiscal Year 2011, this number has increased 
to 3.4% of the NPS mission, but at a reduced incentive amount of $5,000 for a 6-year 
obligation.  Although the MCR seems to have no problem in meeting their recruitment 
numbers, a large percentage of these attrite or discontinue service as soon as their 
obligation is complete. Increasing the scope and budget for these incentives could prove 
extremely cost-effective. 
The Marine Corps has historically been very particular about their bonus policies, 
and recruiters are very reluctant to offer monetary incentives believing that the 
“intangible rewards” of becoming a Marine should suffice for any member of the Corps. 
Unfortunately, the MCR has the highest rate of attrition and likely loses a large number 
of talented individuals to the Army, which also seeks individuals with similar skills but 
can offer them substantially larger enlistment incentives and educational benefits. 
When studying the continuation (or retention) of reservists, it is important to 
consider the incentives offered to Marines to continue service and/or reenlist. Although, 
bonuses and incentives were reviewed and upgraded in 2005, the MCR is still behind the 
other services in offering bonuses necessary to retain people with critical expertise in 
undermanned MOSs.  Hattiangadi et al. (2006) make a solid argument that more bonuses 
may help with increased unit stability and continuation rates by enticing reservists to stay 
                                                 
17 SRIP provides monetary incentive payments for qualified Marines for enlistment, reenlistment, or 
affiliation with the Selected Marine Corps Reserve.  Both NPS and Prior Service (PS) reservists may 
qualify for certain incentives. 
18 Obligors refer to reservists who are currently serving under an obligated drilling requirement.  The 
NPS population is considered obligors, whereas the prior service reserve population is not. 
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in the Reserve.  This seems most relevant in the NPS population since their continuation 
rate for serving an additional year beyond the 6-year initial drilling obligations transition 
point is only 19%. 
The authors discuss several potentially attractive reserve incentives, which may 
be targeted for better continuation such as: bonuses for enlisting in critical units, paid 
travel to drill sites, educational incentives such as loan repayment, bonuses for college 
credit or tuition assistance, and relocation incentives (to join certain units in need of 
certain MOSs since the location and population density of certain reserve sites are a 
continuous challenge).   
The most important conclusion from this study is that bonuses work. They 
decrease attrition and help retain quality Marines serving in the reserves.  The Marine 
Corps may be risking the loss of these individuals to other reserve component branches of 
the military by underutilizing incentives (Hattiangadi et al., 2006). 
C. RETENTION STUDIES 
While attrition studies are vital in determining demographic and other factors that 
are related to the service members not fulfilling their obligated contracts, retention 
studies are of equal importance in assisting analysts in determining the various factors 
associated with service members staying beyond their obligated service contracts.  The 
following studies provide some relevant background for reserve retention behavior. 
1. Deployment Tempo 
Dolfini-Reed and McHugh (2007) examined the effects of deployment tempo on 
SelRes retention by using descriptive statistics to depict varying size and composition of 
SMCR enlisted and officers over time.  They also described specific patterns in activation 
and deployment since September 11, 2001. Lastly, they used survival analysis to 
determine the effect of activation on a reservist’s decision to stay affiliated with SMCR 
units. 
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While various patterns were analyzed, the Dolfini-Reed and McHugh (2007) 
study revealed some interesting findings specific to NPS reserve personnel.  Specifically, 
NPS take cues from activation potential even prior to their actual activation.  For 
example, NPS personnel, which fell into the categories of the most heavily activated 
MOSs, were more likely to leave before being activated than those reservists who are in 
MOSs that were less activated.  Interestingly, this behavior was exclusive to NPS 
personnel, as it did not hold true for prior-service reservists and reserve officers.   Also, 
among the paygrade levels, E-5s were the most likely to leave the SMCR, according to 
Dolfini-Reed and McHugh.  It is noted that the most likely reason for this is that the more 
junior paygrades of E-1 through E-3 are usually new joins and have not yet matured in 
their contract obligations to be at the decision point of staying or leaving.   
In terms of demographics, holding all things constant, NPS blacks had a 34% 
higher risk of leaving than whites and Hispanics had a 20% lower risk of leaving than 
whites.  NPS females had a higher loss rate than NPS males.  Further, the number of 
dependents of NPS personnel had significant affects on loss rates.  As compared to 
Marines with no dependents, NPS Marines who had 1–2 dependents were 40% more 
likely to leave, those with 3-4 dependents were 55% more likely to leave, while those 
with 5 or more dependants were over twice as likely to leave as those with no 
dependants.  This demonstrated a trend for the time period analyzed in the study from 
2001–2006: as the number of dependents increased, the probability to leave also 
increased (Dolfini-Reed & McHugh, 2007). 
Again, an important finding was uncovered with respect to loss behavior before 
and after September 11, 2001.  During the first 16 months following 9/11, NPS enlisted 
Marines had higher loss rates prior to September 11, 2001.  Loss rates after January 2003, 
showed a marked decrease suggesting that servicemen were more likely to remain in 
service.  The authors point out that NPS Marines who were affiliated with the SMCR 
during periods where deployment expectations were clearer seemed to be linked with 
increased retention.  Marines who joined after 2003 may have clearly expected to be 
deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Dolfini-Reed & McHugh, 2007).  As 
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mentioned above in the background section, researchers must consider expectations, 
which warrant future methodology considerations when studying reserve behavior. 
2. Intangible Factors of Retention 
As previously described, monetary incentives can play an important role in the 
reenlistment of qualified personnel, and as the armed forces continuously becomes more 
dependent on an operational reserve, it is essential to understand all the factors that 
motivate reservists to continue to serve.  Some researchers argue that there are many 
relevant factors other than monetary incentives that need to be explored in order to better 
understand the behavior of reservists, and to determine which factors are truly important 
for them when considering reenlistment or continued affiliation. 
Grissmer et al. (1992) introduced how the attitudinal variables and unit 
environment affect reserve reenlistments. They predicted that reserve participation 
numbers would grow over time and the active component’s dependency on the reserves 
would be immense, even to the point of replacing large portions of the active component 
for certain military roles and functions. They pointed out that the Army already depends 
on its reserve forces for over one half of all its wartime needs. However, because 
reservists have full civilian lives and are only serving in the military part time (one 
weekend a month and two weeks a year), there are real concerns with combat and unit 
readiness.  One may argue that with today’s operational and deployment tempo, the 
organizational health of the reserves should be first priority.  
Grissmer et al. (1992) recognize that some of the same basic factors that affect 
civilian moonlighting, such as choosing to take on a second job and the possible 
monetary gains that will be received are at play in reservists. Still, it is important to note 
that military reserve service is very different from civilian moonlighting jobs (which will 
be covered later in the theoretical model chapter).  In general, reserve schedules are 
inflexible and can conflict with important family and job-related events.  Also, although 
reserve service is protected by law, they place a large burden on some employers, which 
makes it hard to positively support their employees.  However, in contrast to 
moonlighting theory, there are also benefits not available in typical moonlighting jobs 
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such as retirement benefits, valuable training, bonuses, and job security. Also there are 
intangible benefits that are highly valuable to some such as patriotism and serving one’s 
country. 
Using bivariate relationship models, Grissmer et al. (1992) analyzed data from the 
1986 survey of enlisted personnel and common personnel data obtained on reserve 
components by looking forward in time (focusing on servicemen at early or mid-career 
and at the end of their enlisted term of service).  As a result, they were able to determine 
that employer attitudes, spousal attitudes, and unit satisfaction were important in 
reservists’ decision to reenlist.  The study determined that about 15–20% of supervisors 
had negative attitudes towards reserve service and this attitude could result in lower 
wages, lower rates of promotion, etc. Local government jobs such as policemen had the 
most unfavorable attitudes possibly due to the difficulties posed to managers with shift 
schedules. Servicemembers with jobs in the private sector had the highest loss of wages 
due to their reserve obligations. When the relationship was analyzed using a bivariate 
model, it was found that servicemembers of employers with very unfavorable attitudes 
choose to reenlist at a rate of 68%, while those with employers with favorable attitudes 
had a rate of 79.3%. 
Spousal attitudes, on the other hand had a much larger effect on reenlistment rate. 
Those with spouses that had very unfavorable attitudes reenlisted at only 42.1% rate, 
whereas those with supportive spouses reenlisted at an 85.1% rate.  Younger 
servicemembers were more affected by spousal attitude than more senior personnel, 
possibly due to younger reservists choosing not to continue if their spouse had a very 
negative attitude.  Dissatisfaction with their specific units, due to poor training, 
equipment and morale was also found to have a small but significant effect on 
reenlistment.  Conclusions from this study point to spousal attitudes as the most 
important factor affecting reservist reenlistment, followed by civilian employer attitudes 
and unit satisfaction. 
It is, however, important to realize that the data is based on perceived attitudes 
and many times the survey data was not reflective of actual reenlistments; in fact, actual 
reenlistment rates were much higher than the survey data showed. Still, it is important to 
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take into consideration these attitudinal effects and possibly base new policies and 
programs that will help increase positive spousal attitudes (via family and support 
programs), employer attitudes (with tax deductions for employing reservists and other 
support programs), and provide better support to reserve units with better equipment and 
training facilities. All of these would serve to increase the rates of reenlistment, which 
would help retain qualified individuals and increase reserve unit morale, while at the 
same time lowering training costs. 
D. CONTINUATION STUDIES 
Although retention and continuation are interrelated, they are not the same.  
Continuation studies focus not just on whether a person is retained in service at the 
completion of their contracts, but rather, of those individuals that did remain, did they 
end up continuing service at various points in time beyond their contracts.  It can 
arguably be the most preferred approaches when examining reserve behavior since 
reservists have such unrestrictive reenlistment contracts, which contrast to those of the 
active component.  There have been very few selected reserve studies that have utilized 
this continuation rate focus. 
1. Reserve and Guard Continuation 
Hansen and Macleod (2004) focused their study on retention in both the reserve 
and guard components with a continuation rate methodology by utilizing logistic 
regression estimates on the probability of remaining in the Selected Reserve.  More 
specifically, they defined continuation rate as the proportion of Selected Reserve 
members from FY 2000–FY 2003 who chose to renew their reenlistments and remain in 
the reserves.  As with many studies discussed in this chapter, their analysis provided 
many relevant factors that analysts should consider when studying reserve retention 
behavior such as: demographics, education–level, paygrade, length of military service, 




is important to note that although relevant to retention-focused studies, they found that 
local economic conditions such as state unemployment rates were not the primary drivers 
for continuation rates.   
Some primary drivers were education–level, occupational specialty, and 
geographic location.  Retention increases with level of education until reservists reach the 
point at which they obtain college degrees.  This suggests that many reservists have the 
propensity to stay while attending college or technical schools.  This strongly implies that 
a challenge for reserve forces is to continually compete with the private sector for highly 
educated people.  Another distinction was that certain occupational specialties may 
experience lower continuation rates because their civilian earning opportunities are 
simply higher.  Furthermore, when examining geographic location, they suggest that 
regional staffing difficulties and reserve unit densities in certain areas may account for 
skewing the results and adding difficulty in their specific interpretation, but offer 
planners some depth in closely considering the multitude of factors that may exist relative 
to reservists serving in particular regional areas. 
Lastly, data restrictions constrained the authors’ ability to control for those 
reservists who were activated, mobilized, or deployed at any point during the fiscal years 
covered.  Another limitation was that the metric of reenlistment did not fully measure 
complete continuation behavior since those reservist who chose to continue service may 
have extended or continued to participate without actually reenlisting. 
2. Navy Reenlistment Bonus and Continuation 
Lien (2006) analyzed the effects of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses on 
continuation rates in the Navy Selected Reserve by using Reserve Component Common 
Personnel Data System (RCCPDS) data from October 1999 to March 2005.  Through 
various logistic models, she determined various impacts of a bonus on sailors’ decision to 
reenlist.  Among those results, she found that NPS reservists who were in receipt of an 
enlistment bonus had increased their 12-month continuation probabilities by 12% (or 8.9 
percentage points), and for 24-month continuation rates by 26% (or 14 percentage 
points).  Also, of those who were eligible for a reenlistment bonus, only 32% of those 
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reenlisting actually took the bonus.  This suggests that the bonus awareness of Sailors is 
either low, or it could be that reservists are reluctant to accept the bonus since it would 
add additional constraints to their reserve service, as indicated from previous MCR 
studies. 
3. Marine Corps Prior Service Continuation Rates 
Price (2010) used a continuation model for estimating the effects of activations on 
the Prior Service SMCR unit population and found that a positive relationship existed 
between activation and continuation; though, this effect rapidly became negative as the 
length of activation increased.  He used probit models to estimate 12-month continuation 
rates for both prior reserve component and prior active component Marines serving at 
various tour length intervals (4, 12, and 24 months).  He was able to control for bias in 
the parameters for those individuals who may have been currently deployed and unable to 
exit service by looking at 12-month continuation rates.  His models included previous 
relevant variables used in prior research, such as: demographics, monetary incentives, 
unemployment rate, military ability variables, fiscal year effects and AFQT19 score.  
Additionally, he created a model that was designed to identify certain effects of military 
knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs), which provide a starting point to further examine 
non-prior service attrition and continuation behavior.   
E. SUMMARY 
This review of the literature has attempted to capture the most relevant reserve 
studies to date.  Now, more than ever before, reserve studies are becoming a high priority 
since the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts have demanded so much reserve force support 
over the past 10 years.  This brief literature review has provided a basis for the central 
themes that are essential to reserve behavior.  It also marks the clear distinction of how 
                                                 
19 Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) is an aptitude test which generates a composite of four 
core written tests given to new military recruits which measure knowledge across a group of typical high 
school- level academic disciplines.  Scores are categorized into groups which indicate high quality and low 
quality recruits.  AFQT categories 1-3A are considered high-quality recruits and AFQT categories 3B and 
below are considered low-quality. 
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and why certain techniques of attrition and retention focused studies are used and why.  
Several conclusions can be made from this review. 
 A total force perspective should be utilized when studying reserve behavior. 
 Deployment tempo has significant effects on whether a reservist continues service 
inside their contract, and longer periods of activation also result in higher loss 
rates. 
 Enlisted members make up the preponderance of reserve deployments. 
 Mobilization characteristics are relevant to consider given the potential 
expectation to deploy outside the continental U.S. (CONUS) post-9/11.  Current 
evidence supports that those who do not get deployed overseas have higher 
incidents of loss rate behavior. 
 Monetary and educational incentives and their effect on MCR retention should be 
considered.  Studies suggest that offering more bonus options for reenlistment to 
include both higher monetary bonus payout, as well as, more bonus programs 
available for reservists to use, may help increase reserve continuation.   
 Comprehensively, several common relationships exist to include: demographics, 
education–level, paygrade, length of military service, geographic location, local 
economic conditions, fiscal year effects, and occupational specialties. 
 Intangible factors such as spousal and employer attitudes toward service, 
dissatisfaction with specific units, morale, leadership, and poor unit cohesion are 
relevant to consider when studying reserve retention and very difficult to measure 
using multivariate econometric models, which rely solely on observational data.  
 Valid model choice and statistical approach is crucial in estimating the effects of 
attrition, retention, or continuation.  Continuation rate models seem to provide a 
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III. THEORETICAL MODELS OF RETENTION 
The following sections consider theoretical models from an economic perspective.  
Each model will be reviewed for its relevance to the retention behavior of reservists.  
Section A will analyze the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model, which considers 
the net monetary returns to continued military service.  Section B will present the 
Expected Utility of Deployment model, which considers the monetary effects combined 
with the probability of deployment duration.  Section C will consider Moonlighting 
Theory as an explanation for reserve behavior. 
A. ANNUALIZED COST OF LEAVING 
The Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model brings into consideration an 
individual’s civilian earnings versus military earnings and the expected decrease in 
earnings as a result of leaving.  Additionally, it considers unemployment rates and net 
preference for civilian versus military life.  A notable aspect of the ACOL model is that it 
accounts for the number of years previously spent in the military and, therefore, loss of 
time and experience needed for civilian employment.  Hansen and Wenger (2005) 
summarized the ACOL model, which predicts that an individual will continue serving for 
























t = Years of Previous Military Service 
y = Years of Service Beyond Present 
Mi = Expected Military Compensation for the i-th Year of Service 
Ci = Expected Civilian Compensation for the i-th Year of Service 
r = Real Discount Rate 
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τ = Individual Relative Preference for Civilian vs. Military Employment   
As can be seen from the model, an individual’s “taste” for civilian employment is 
considered in the model as a negative factor in military continuation and is combined 
with their expected civilian earnings for the given year.  In contrast, the expected military 
compensation is a positive factor in military continuation.  The ACOL model predicts 
that an individual will remain in service so long as the individual’s benefits from military 
employment exceed those benefits yielded by civilian employment, where net benefits 
incorporate the individual’s taste for each occupational option.   
Over the time covered in this specific study, unemployment rates and possible 
monetary benefits of deploying could increase an individual’s likelihood of military 
continuation based on the ACOL model.  For example, if a reservist is unemployed or 
facing static civilian earnings for the future year, or some future period, there is a 
stronger probability of continuation.   
During the Overlap-9/11 time period, it is hypothesized that the expectation of 
deployment is undetermined and therefore the “taste” for military employment may not 
be as strong of a factor.  In comparison, for the Post-9/11 period, it is hypothesized that 
deployment constitutes a strong expectation and therefore the “taste” for military 
employment has become very specific.  Consequently, the effect of τ could have 
increased during the Post-9/11 period. 
In summary, the ACOL model helps describe the net expectation of a reservist’s 
continuation as based on their expected monetary benefits and the individual’s tastes for 
military and civilian employment.  This model helps provide a foundation for specifying 
the multivariate models that will be estimated in this study. 
B. EXPECTED UTILITY OF DEPLOYMENT 
Another relevant model to consider is the Expected Utility of Deployment Model.  
As shown below, this model brings into consideration an individual’s income, duration of 
deployment and duration of time between deployments.   
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where, 
p = Probability of Deployment 
m = Base Pay  
  = Amount of Deployment Pay 
d = Deployment Time 
  = 2/)( 12 dd   
  = 1d  
In this formulation, 1d  and 2d represent the minimum and maximum deployment 
times, respectively and therefore represents the mean deployment time.  It should be 
noted that 21 represents the probability density for the uniform distribution during the 
deployment interval.  The expected utility while deployed is given by ),1,( dddmU   
(Hosek et al., 2006). 
This model incorporates deployment time, as well as the probability of 
deployment in contrast to time spent at home (not deployed).  It is important to note that 
the model does not allow freedom for personal selection of the parameters and therefore 
the time deployed may differ from the preferred deployment duration.  Consequently, an 
increase in can result in either an increased or reduced expected utility depending on 
the actual preferred mean deployment time.  For example, if a reservist has a preferred 
deployment time * and *  , then an increase in   would result in a higher expected 
utility.  Conversely, if *  , then an increase in   would result in a lower expected 
utility.  It can be hypothesized from this that too great an increase in   above * may 
negatively affect continuation.  The observation below from Hosek et al. (2006, p. 9) 
underscores the importance of considering the Expected Utility of Deployment model 
while developing a theoretical framework for this analysis on NPS reservists: 
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current realization of deployment causes the individual to revise the 
estimates of p, , or  …[and] could affect expected utility.  For instance, 
expectations about the frequency and duration of deployment may have 
changed markedly because of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
In consideration of this observation, the above model forms a vital part of our 
analysis of continuation among NPS reservists, particularly with respect to deployment 
and mobilization.   
C. MOONLIGHTING THEORY 
Moonlighting Theory is the traditional concept that reserve enlistment decisions 
are virtually indistinguishable from other civilian decisions on holding a second job.  If 
this is the case, labor supply theory on moonlighting should be a strong consideration in 
this analysis of NPS reserve continuation.   
Previous research has suggested that civilian moonlighting intrinsically differs 
from reserve participation.  Several factors contribute to this as discussed by Arkes and 
Kilburn (2005, p.13):  
Extensive training required for the reserves (having an effect on the time 
costs and the training benefits of participation), the priority their reserve 
participation can take over their primary job, the job security of the 
reserves, and many of the nonmonetary benefits of participating all serve 
to make the decision to participate in the reserves much more complex 
than the decision of whether to moonlight beyond one’s primary job. 
Another major difference between moonlighting and reserve participation noted 
in Fugita and Lakhani (1991) is the flexibility of hours.  It is assumed that a moonlighting 
individual can select hours for the secondary job whereas reserve participation does not 
allow for such flexibility.   
In a further test of the applicability of the theory of labor supply to moonlighting 
(second jobs) and its relevance to reserve behavior, an in-depth analysis by Mehay (1991) 
statistically analyzed the hypothesis that the two categories were behaviorally identical.  
This study utilized a logistic model that considered a cross comparison of an individual’s 
choice to work only one full-time civilian job, one full-time primary civilian job with a 
 41
second civilian job (moonlighting), or one full-time primary civilian job with 
simultaneous reserve participation.  Statistical analysis demonstrated that there was a 
significant difference between moonlighting in addition to a full time job and reserve 
participation in addition to a full time job.  Particularly, underemployment on the main 
job was not a primary factor associated with reserve participation (Mehay, 1991).  
Economic factors, such as age, education, and economic status were found to be relevant 
in the cited study. 
In consideration of other moonlighting research it is logical to assume that civilian 
job moonlighting theory does not provide a firm basis for specifying models of military 
reserve participation.  In consequence, this research will not use labor supply models as a 
theoretical basis specifying a reserve behavioral model. 
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IV. SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS 
The preponderance of research over the last 20 years has focused on two central 
themes, organization commitment and job satisfaction.  Most theories applied to these 
themes examine them with great detail in search of potential causes linked to retention 
and turnover such as pay, benefits, repetitive work, coworker influences, fairness, 
recognition, work-family conflicts, time spent away from home, promotional 
opportunities, and other job alternatives, to name only a few.  Additionally, numerous 
theorists have made major gains in research investigating other indicators that may lead 
to job dissatisfaction, such as attitudinal factors.  Attitudinal factors are perceived 
attitudes from supervisors towards their employees, or spousal attitudes.  Empirical 
research in these areas suggests three common denominators serve as antecedents for job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment.  Those three antecedents are: (1) Structural: 
individual based characteristics, (2) Environmental: institutional/organizational related 
influencers, and (3) Personal: external influencers such as primary civilian occupation 
and family impacts.   
In order to focus this vast selection of literature as it relates to Marine Corps 
Reserve retention behavior, this chapter will draw from the results of two recent Marine 
Corps Reserve retention surveys conducted in 2009 and 2010, and will incorporate those 
key findings as they pertain to various job satisfaction and organizational commitment 
literature20.  This discussion will guide and align social and psychological areas of 
importance by organizing the key survey results and key literature topics into the three 
antecedent influence areas of structural, environmental, and personal. 
                                                 
20 The Marine Corps Reserve Retention Surveys of 2009 and 2010 analyzed 3,820 responses and 
3,113 responses, respectively, to a 96 question online survey initiated by M&RA, Quantico, VA.  These 
surveys summarized reservists’ continuation intentions and unobservable attitudes or trends affecting 
continuation decisions.  Approximately 83% of respondents were among the ranks considered in this thesis 
(E-1 through E-5). 
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A. STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
Structural factors are those which include group dynamics, interpersonal 
relationships, job hazards of deployment, and leadership as they pertain to the reservist. 
1. Reasons for Joining the Reserves 
In assessing the potential reasons why a person would join the reserves, it is 
important to note that these reasons may not only vary on an individual basis, but also 
appear to vary across the different service branches.  Although this analysis is aimed at 
“reserve” continuation decisions and behavior, it is notable that those who join the 
Marine Corps Reserve appear to have the most intrinsic motivations as compared to the 
other services.  Fugita and Lakhani (1991) point out Marine reservists tend to affiliate 
due to more intangible benefits rather than monetary incentives.  Specifically, from a 
presentation given by Mark C. Regets (1990), he described that, “in a 1975 survey of 
non-prior service Marine Corps reservists, 67% listed “to be a Marine” as an important 
motivation for joining versus 41% for pay” (As cited in Fugita & Lakhani, 1991, p. 5).  
This need for affiliation will be discussed further as it is relevant to retention with more 
recent research in McClelland’s Learned Needs Theory below. 
2. Monetary Incentive 
According to the Report of the Presidents Commission on an All-Volunteer Force 
(1970) in the early years of designing strategies for an “All Volunteer Force”:  
Military compensation in the early years of service is now so low that it 
will not sustain an all-volunteer force of the quality desired. Until that 
condition is corrected, an all-volunteer force cannot be realized. (As cited 
in Rostker, 2006, p.82) 
Military sociologist Charles Moskos asserted that the archetypal model of viewing 
military from the previous draft era institutional model whereby military service was 
closely aligned with more value driven service choices such as “collective good,” has 
now shifted to a new paradigm model built upon an organizational format, which more 
closely aligns with the civilian marketplace.  As a result, military members started 
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identifying less with serving for a higher cause or good and motivated more to serve with 
self-interests and monetary rewards in mind.  Therefore, procuring better retention 
sparked a divide in two competing schools of thought, utilitarianism, which bears a 
resemblance to the organizational format versus collectivism, which is more closely 
aligned with the institutional format (Moore, 2002, p.261).  These competing ideals still 
exist today.  It is very possible that currently in the Post-9/11 period that there could be 
an increase in the ideals associated with the institutional format following the events of 
September 9/11.   However, considering the Post-9/11 economic downturn and recent 
recession, individuals are likely motivated by some monetary aspects.  
Since then, each service branch has incorporated an unparalleled amount of 
monetary incentives such as pay, educational benefits, and other incentives to include 
enlistment and reenlistment bonuses.  These expenses have been incurred by the military 
in an effort to successfully attract qualified individuals from the civilian job market 
(Moore, 2002).  
For reservists, whose time is mostly spent in the civilian labor market, pecuniary 
influencers appear even more relevant motivators for continuation than the active 
component and reservists may be more responsive to increases in pay and other benefits 
associated with their service.  The results from the 2010 Marine Corps Retention Survey 
support this notion; 78% of respondents who were unlikely to reenlist stated that 
monetary incentives were a strong influence to stay. Additionally, reservists in the survey 
responded that both traditional Montgomery G.I. Bill (MGIB) and Post-9/11 educational 
benefits were strong influencers for retention.  Figure 8 shows MGIB benefits results on 










Do not intend to reenlist Intend to reenlist
Response to MGIB and post-9/11 MGIB Benefits
Strong influence to stay Influence to stay




Source: M&RA, RAP, Quantico, VA., 2010 Reserve Retention Survey Results Analysis 
Figure 8.   2010 Reserve Survey Results for MGIB Influence on Intention to Reenlist 
Of respondents who did not intend to reenlist, 71.3% stated that MGIB or Post-
9/11 educational benefits was a strong influence to stay;  and among those who did intend 
to reenlist, 92.4% reported that these benefits were strong influencers to stay.  Based on 
these statistics, monetary incentive and educational benefits appear to provide a strong 
incentive among reservists to continue in service. 
3. Job Hazards 
Military mobilization/deployment can be viewed as a type of job hazard that 
individuals serving in the military must confront.  Previous research has indicated that 
deployments can have both positive and negative impacts on retention, which has been 
extremely difficult to interpret.  Additionally, it has not been until recently, over the past 
10 years, that researchers have had the opportunity to estimate specific deployment 
effects on the active and reserve component forces.  As certain economic utility 
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maximizing models offer legitimate discussion with respect to certain tastes for military 
service, examining deployment effects from a social and psychological perspective is also 
relevant.  Previous job satisfaction studies have indicated that as an individual’s job 
complexity and quantitative workload increases, job satisfaction decreases.  Similarly, 
job attributes in the military, where additional job complexity and work load increase 
(such as mobilizations), may contribute to an individual’s retention decision.  Most 
importantly, however, job stressors affect people in different ways.  This makes the 
analysis of how mobilization affects certain military members, and their propensity to 
continue service, problematic.  Each person is affected differently by stress coping 
abilities (Hosek et al., 2006). 
The 2010 Marine Corps Retention Survey yielded some interesting results that 
pertain to this discussion.  Figure 9 shows the respondents’ opinions on their mobilization 
frequency.    
 
 
Source: M&RA, RAP, Quantico, VA., 2010 Reserve Retention Survey Results Analysis 
Figure 9.   2010 Reserve Survey Results for MGIB Influence on Retention Intention 
Although 64% of Marines who responded indicated being satisfied with their 
mobilization frequencies, this contradicts most empirical research that commonly links 
negative retention effects associated with mobilization.  This highlights the complicated 
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nature of establishing the effect of deployment. However, these responses may be 
affected by the specific time period in question; most empirical research is only available 
for the Overlap-9/11 period or before, when the lack of expectation on mobilization may 
explain the negative effects of an actual mobilization.  In contrast, these surveys were 
conducted with responses from the Post-9/11 period enlistees, who may have had an 
expectation of mobilization and, therefore, reported a positive satisfaction with 
mobilization frequencies. 
When looking at deployment through the lens of how the experience of time away 
from home influences individuals, it may be possible to uncover the potential dominating 
factors that influence deployment that are nested within the deployment experience itself.  
According to the 2010 Marine Corps Reserve Retention Survey, 74.8% of respondents 
indicated that they are satisfied or very satisfied with their time away (75% in FY09).  
Consequently, factors upon reservists’ return home should be considered, such as 
demobilization and the potential loss of unit cohesion.  For example, if reserve Marines 
demobilize and return to a climate where cohesion rapidly dissipates as they re-enter 
civilian life, they may be less satisfied than prior to the mobilization or while mobilized.  
In turn, reduced satisfaction may reduce continuation.  Therefore, it is possible that 
mobilization has a positive impact on retention while demobilization has a negative 
impact. 
B. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
1. Role Conflict: Spouse and Family Influence 
Previous active duty studies explain that military service in general demands a 
great deal of time spent away from home either with routine training, preparation training 
for deployments, or with the actual deployment itself (Quester et al., 2006).  Arguably, 
for the reserves, the strain and demand placed on them may produce even more spouse 
and family conflicts since it may be fundamentally expected (by family members) that 
their reserve roles are part-time (1-weekend out of the month).  
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Interestingly, a large portion of respondents to the same survey indicated that their 
spouses “favored their leaving.”  Figure 10 shows the perceived spousal attitudes as self-
reported by obligors in the 2010 Reserve Retention Survey.   
 
 
Source: M&RA, RAP, Quantico, VA., 2010 Reserve Retention Survey Results Analysis 
Figure 10.   2010 Reserve Survey Results for Spousal Attitudes on Intention to Reenlist 
As shown, nearly half of the respondents indicated they believed their spouses 
would prefer them to leave the reserve force.  Several factors could explain the spousal 
factors reported.  It can be hypothesized that the combination of increased maturity and 
responsibilities over time plays a large role in this expected trend.  For example, a 
reservist’s spouse may expect less absence and more focus on the primary job— 
particularly if the civilian job already demands a great deal of time requiring substantial 
absence. 
According to the Theory of Planned Behavior discussed in Weiss et al. (2002), an 
individual’s behavior can be closely predicted by considering influencing factors such as 
the individual’s perception of control over the behavior and the subjective expectations of 
friends or family.  Accordingly, a negative spousal attitude towards continuation may 
define a reservist’s planned behavior with respect to continuation.  Once defined, this 
planned behavior will be completed regardless of whether the individuals themselves 
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would prefer to continue.  This Theory of Planned Behavior may therefore result in the 
reserve intentions that are presented below.  Figure 11 outlines 2010 Reserve Survey 
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Source: M&RA, RAP, Quantico, VA., 2010 Reserve Retention Survey Results Analysis 
Figure 11.   2010 Reserve Survey Results for Family Influence Among Reservists 
Intending to Reenlist 
As can be seen from the chart, 69.66% of respondents who reported a negative 
family influence stated that they would be either unlikely or very unlikely to continue and 
only 30.34% stated that they would be either likely or very likely to continue.  In 
contrast, 72.17% of respondents who reported a positive family influence stated that they 
would either likely or very likely to continue and only 27.83% reported that they would 
be unlikely or very unlikely to continue.  Consequently, it appears that a positive family 
influence has nearly an exact opposite effect on reserve continuation as compared to a 
negative family influence.  This suggests the impacts of family support among reservists 
are critical in determining reserve continuation behavior.  
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2. Unfolding Model of Voluntary Turnover 
The Unfolding Model of Voluntary Turnover is a contemporary theory describing 
the reasons behind an individual’s choice to remain or leave a job.  Comprehensively the 
model considers factors that may attribute to a sense of “embeddedness” in a job and 
therefore commitment and how these are affected when a “shock” is introduced.  Shocks 
are considered to be jarring events, which introduce the idea of leaving to the individual.   
For reservists, these shocks could include: deployment, increased responsibilities at 
primary civilian job, increased responsibilities of leadership in the reserve job, increased 
school conflicts, and unexpected increase in family responsibilities or concerns (Mitchell 
& Lee, 2001). 
If individuals become reservists with the plan of balancing civilian work 
effectively with demands of reserve participation but later experience a sudden increase 
in civilian job responsibilities, they may be less likely to continue in the reserves as a 
result of this shock.  Likewise, if an individual does not anticipate deployment upon 
joining the reserves they may opt to leave on a basis of the shock of deployment.  Thus, 
the effect of deployment may be largely dependent on time period as reservists who 
joined in the Post-9/11 period likely expected to deploy and therefore did not receive a 
shock but rather experienced a fulfillment of their expectations.   Met expectations play a 
critical role in an individual’s intention to continue as they could counter-balance the 
negative effect of introduced shocks.  In contrast, those reservists serving in the Overlap-
9/11 period may have expected not to deploy and yet received the shock of deployment.  
Therefore this group may have had unmet expectations and also experienced a shock that 
may have propelled them to leave reserve service. 
As noted above, increased leadership responsibilities on the reserve job may be 
seen as a negatively impacting shock.  However, it is also possible that individuals 
joining Marine Reserves have an expectation of leadership in some capacity and therefore 
increased responsibilities in this area may lead to a fulfillment of self ideals.  Aron et al. 
(2004) note that Self-Expansion Theory supports the notion that people have the general 
desire to expand themselves.  Specifically, individuals attempt to, “seek and expand 
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themselves by acquiring resources, identities, and perspectives.  That is, this is a 
motivation to enhance potential efficacy” (p.103).  If one’s life circumstances impose 
rapid changes, which become more difficult to integrate easily, the result is over-
expansion.  Conversely, if circumstances provide insufficient opportunities to expand 
one’s self and meet personal expectations, under-expansion will result.  Accordingly, 
although increased reserve service responsibility in leadership may result in over-
expansion for some, there is also a strong possibility that an increased leadership role 
prevents under-expansion of self.  The 2010 Reserve Retention Survey analyzed the 
results of an increased leadership role as self-reported by obligors.  Figure 12 graphically 
depicts reservists’ responses concerning the influence increased leadership 
responsibilities would have on their intention to continue. 
 
 
Source: M&RA, RAP, Quantico, VA., 2010 Reserve Retention Survey Results Analysis 






As shown, approximately 92% of Marine reservists reported that an increased 
responsibility to lead and train Marines was a positive influence or a strong positive 
influence on their intention to continue in the reserves.  Thus, it appears that increased 
leadership responsibilities are not a detrimental shock to Marine reservists but rather a 
fulfillment in met expectations. 
C. PERSONAL FACTORS 
1. Human Motivation Theory 
Weiss et al. (2002) support that substantial previous literature indicate certain 
organizations provide a context for “achievement motivation” and “performance”.  
Individuals, who enjoy being both challenged and placed in situations to overcome 
difficult tasks, may flourish in work settings that can provide this environment.  
Intrinsically speaking, those serving in the Marine Corps as reservists may possess 
similar attributes and have self-selected into an environment where “performing well” is 
the normal expectation. 
A highly recognized motivational theory that closely aligns with motivation 
behavior in the reserves is McClelland’s Learned Needs Theory.  McClelland contends 
that individuals have learned and acquired certain needs from the culture of society in 
their earlier stages of life.  Specifically, McClelland posits the following four needs exist 
within all individuals and influences the manner in which they are motivated:  (1) Need 
for Achievement, (2) Need for Power, (3) Need for Affiliation, (4) Need for Autonomy. 
First, the need for achievement aligns well with Marine Corps Reserve 
participation.  McClelland characterized the need for achievement as, “behavior towards 
competition with a standard of excellence” (Steers et al., 1996, p. 18).  Those individuals 
who fall into this category have higher tendencies towards achieving goals, taking 
calculated risks, and are more preoccupied with task accomplishment.  Reservists 
volunteer to serve their country above and beyond natural demands of civilian living, as 
well as serving in arguably the most challenging branch within the military.  Thus, 
reservists serving in the Marine Corps may perhaps be systematically different from 
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reservists serving in other branches.  Results from the 2010 Marine Corps Retention 
Survey found that most Marines desire a greater level of leadership responsibility as 
indicated in Figure 12, and therefore increasing leadership opportunities may help 
increase retention.   
Next, the need for power tends to represent those who are superior performers and 
have above average records.  The total percentage of NPS reservist who entered into 
service with high quality AFQT scores (Category 1-3A) were 78% within the population 
of this analysis.  Furthermore, fundamental practices in military statistical studies most 
often involve using variables that are representative to an individual’s performance and 
ability.  This supports the theoretical tenets within McClelland’s Learned Needs Model. 
The need for affiliation was defined as individuals who have a strong desire for 
approval and reassurance and individuals with tendencies to conform to the wishes and 
needs of others when pressured by valued friendships (Steers et al., 1996).  This can be 
legitimized through the Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP 6-11, 2002, 
p.15), where it is cited, 
They were closer to me than I could say, closer than any friends had been 
or ever would be…Men, I now knew, do not fight for flag or country, for 
the Marine Corps or glory, or any other abstraction.  They fight for one 
another.  Any man in combat who lacks comrades who will die for him, or 
for whom he is willing to die, is not a man at all.  He is truly damned.” 
Marine Corps history culturally embodies a strong ethos and esprit de corps, 
which arguably attracts those who embrace it.  The extraordinary cohesion between 
Marines is said to be more than a function of a particular unit within the Corps, but rather 
a function of the Corps itself (p.15). 
Lastly, the need for autonomy is defined by McClelland as those who need a 
sense of individuality.  This appears to exist more within the civilian community, yet 
brings up an interesting point.  Since reservists work within the spectrum of both civilian 
and military realms, they may possess stronger characteristics of both autonomy and 
affiliation and therefore place a greater value in both characteristics, suggesting that 
incentives for reservists may be different than those in the active component. Since 
 55
reservists do not commit to active duty service, there is clearly some aspect of autonomy 
in civilian life that is critical to their identity as a person.  However, participation in the 
reserves, particularly the Marine Corps, demonstrates an attachment of group affiliation. 
Weiss et al. (2002) note, “One’s identity as a group member may be central to the self, 
therefore increasing attachment to that group because one would experience a significant 
loss of the self should he or she leave that organization” (p.23). This complex group 
affiliation versus individualism balance justifies the need for manpower analysts to step 
outside the “quantitative magnifying glass” and analyze reserve behavior more through 
the fundamental building blocks of human motivational models. 
D. SUMMARY 
The social and psychological insights outlined in this chapter present an 
interesting supplement to standard economic theoretical perspectives commonly used in 
econometric analyses.  Notably, the structural, environmental, and personal factors 
discussed here provide an enriched perspective on reserve continuation rates.  Certain 
factors were seen to have a mutually positive effect on continuation; for instance, 
increased leadership responsibilities could help fulfill personal expectations.  However, 
some factors compete against one another.  For example, while increased leadership 
responsibilities may have a positive effect on continuation, the resultant increased work 
load may have a negative effect.  Environmentally, family and spousal attitudes were also 
significant contributors to reservists’ intentions to continue, and may have competed 
against the positive influence of a personal need for affiliation.   
In conclusion, while consideration of these social and psychological factors was 
not intended to provide an all-encompassing view of reserve continuation behavior, it is 
relevant to this thesis.  These factors contribute to the over-arching themes of job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment and therefore ultimately impact the decision 
to stay or quit military service.  Thus, it is important to review these factors as a 
framework for the statistical analysis. 
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V. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter will discuss each data source, methodology, and the limitations of 
this study.  Section A will discuss the data sources, Section B will describe the scope and 
methodology, and Section C will discuss the data limitations. 
A. DATA SOURCES 
1. Reserve Affairs Personnel Plans and Policy (RAP) 
All data supplied for this study was provided by RAP, which worked in 
conjunction with DMDC and CNA to obtain additional data required.  All data elements 
containing any personal identifiable information were sanitized prior to obtainment.  RAP 
utilized the Marine Corps Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) in order to acquire most 
of the data.    
a. Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) 
Data containing information for the Montgomery G.I. Bill and data with 
monetary incentives, which included enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, were obtained 
by RAP.  However, manpower policy prior to fiscal year (FY) 2011 did not extend 
eligibility for reenlistment or affiliation bonuses to non-prior service personnel below the 
rank of sergeant, and only then, after the waterfall transition point.  Thus, monetary 
incentives were not relevant to the subject population and only the Montgomery G.I. Bill 
data was usable. 
b. Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) 
Monthly seasonally adjusted state unemployment data were obtained for 
the entire range of the data set from December 1994 to September 2010.  This 
unemployment data originated from the U.S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics. 
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c. Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW)21 
The TFDW records its data elements from the Marine Corps Total Force 
System (MCTFS) at the end of every month.  These MCTFS data elements gather all 
administrative pay and personnel information for all Marines serving in both the active 
and reserve components, and stores end-of-month observations of certain data elements 
into TFDW.  The resulting uploads, called sequences, contain a monthly snapshot of the 
Total Force.  Appendix A outlines the specific dates of each sequence snapshot and 
ranged from—December 31, 1994 to September 30, 2010 (sequences 92-259).  However, 
only quarterly observations prior to FY 1999 were consistent and available. Thus, for this 
thesis, 168 sequence dates and 79 data fields were pulled from TDFW amounting to 
4,696,141 monthly-person observations.   However, econometric analysis will be limited 
to quarterly observations for Fiscal Year 1998 due to the above mentioned data 
limitations.   Specific sequence dates of this study will encompass the following22: 
 Unrestricted Full Sample (covering all time periods) 
o Sequence dates: 106 to 247 
 Restricted Pre-9/11 Sample 
o Sequence dates: 106 to 151 
 Restricted Overlap-9/11 Sample 
o  Sequence dates 152 to 223 
 Restricted Post-9/11 Sample 
o Sequence dates 224 to 247 
                                                 
21 The Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) is a restricted system of the Manpower Information 
Technology Branch of Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA). It is the Marine Corps’ official system of 
record for USC Title 10 end strength reporting.  TFDW houses more than 30 years of historical manpower 
data from a variety of USMC and Department of Defense systems, to include MCTFS, MASS, RCCPDS, 
MCTIMS, and DEERS (Price, 2010). 
22 For each time period, limited use of sequences 12 months beyond these sequence dates will be used 
to determine continuation.  For instance, sequence 259 will be used to determine 12-month continuation 
rates for sequence 247. 
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2. Coding 
The MCTFS Codes Manual was utilized to interpret and code each TFDW data 
element.  All data elements were merged and compiled in such a manner for 
Headquarters Marine Corps to utilize the compiled data for continual and future analysis 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The focal point of this thesis is the “waterfall period,”23 which has been identified 
as the top priority by Marine Corps manpower planers.  Determining the possible 
correlations of this drastic decline in reserve continuation with many different factors will 
be elucidated using this research approach.  Figure 13 serves as a graphical representation 
that shows this methodology in detail.  
 
                                                 
23 The “waterfall period” has been awarded its name from USMC Reserve Manpower Planners as a 
means of describing the drastic drop in reserve continuation that takes place upon the completion of NPS 
reservists drilling obligation period.  When graphically depicted, the immense loss takes on the shape of a 
waterfall and results in 81% of the NPS reservists’ non-continuation.   
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Figure 13.   Multivariate Methodology for NPS Continuation Behavior 
As depicted, a binary response multivariate model will be used in obtaining the 
NPS probability of continuation by determining if the person exists in the data 12-months 
beyond their completed 6-year drilling obligation.  
In addition, this study will further analyze and test for potential systematic 
differences among three identified time periods and how they may influence the effects 
of continuation behavior.  In order to test for these hypothesized systematic differences 
across time periods of NPS reserve utilization, Figure 14 depicts how the data sample 
will be isolated with respect to the Pre-9/11, Overlap-9/11, and Post-9/11 time periods.  
Of special note, it is important to underscore that the Post-9/11 period (shown in Figure 
14) only encompasses mainly those who joined the MCR just after September 9/11 until 





Figure 14.   Time Period Restriction Methodology 
Additionally, this research will identify other statistically significant predictors 
with respect to continuation behavior such as mobilization, unemployment rate, unit type, 
occupational field, geographic region of reserve service, Montgomery G.I. Bill usage, 
rank, education, marital status, gender, and age. 
C. DATA LIMITATIONS 
The goal of this thesis is to estimate certain effects on NPS 12-month continuation 
rates for those reservists who have completed 6-year drilling obligations.  Although the 
model does capture valid statistical data, which can be used to calculate continuation 
rates, there are several data limitations to keep in mind.   
A primary limitation of this research involves data availability for the Post-9/11 
time period.  Since the model assesses whether a person exists in the dataset 12-months 
beyond the end of their initial drilling obligation period, the data simply cannot evaluate 
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NPS personnel who began their enlistment periods after FY 2003.  The data can only 
capture records up to September 2010 (sequence 259) and therefore is limited in scope 
for the Post-9/11 model. 
Also, the model does not take into account those who have been lost to attrition 
prior to completing their 6-year drilling obligation. Rather, the data is used to assess those 
who successfully reached the completion of their 6-year contracts, and of those that did, 
which of them ultimately chose to stay in SMCR units.  Currently, manpower planners 
have identified the continuation rate problem to be of first priority; a close second will be 
aimed at examining specific attrition related problems within the NPS population.  Of 
note, the annual attrition rate for the Marine Corp’s NPS population is approximately 9%, 
adding up to just under 50% over six years and will assume top priority for future studies 
(Price, 2011).   
The restricted samples mentioned above (Pre-9/11, Overlap-9/11, and Post-9/11) 
do not contain identical sample sizes within each category.  This is a result of both the 
combination of research design and time specific limitations.  For example, in order to 
facilitate an equal sample size for the Post-9/11 time period, this analysis would need to 
wait five more years to allow for those who enlisted during the years of 2004 – 2007 to 
reach 1-year beyond the completion of their 6-year contracts during the years of 2011 - 
2014 in order to test for their decision to continue. This limitation is graphically apparent 
in Figure 9 above.  As seen in Figure 9, the Full Sample Model (covering all periods), 
and the Overlap-9/11 Model provide the most observations, N=34,051 and N=18,027 
respectively.  Whereas, the Post-9/11 can only account for 2-years of continuation rates 
with decision points occurring at 2008 and 2009 with N=6818.   However, these numbers 
can still provide important insight into Post-9/11 continuation behavior. 
Valid monetary reenlistment bonus data was initially obtained from DMDC to 
isolate for those possible incentive effects on continuation.  However, Pre-FY11 Marine 
Corps policies that limited reenlistment bonuses to the ranks of NPS Sergeants and above 
after completing their 6-year drilling obligation prevented their use in this study.  On the 
other hand, Montgomery G.I. Bill usage data was obtained and was controlled for in the 
statistical models. 
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Lastly, deployment data and variables are problematic in two ways.  First, since 
prior to 9/11, the NPS population had virtually no mobilizations/deployments. To be 
exact, a total of 24-NPS-Marines were mobilized in support of a contingency operation 
prior to 9/11, therefore, due to this small number; regression analysis is unsubstantial as it 
pertains to mobilization and lacks relevance.  However, this supports the previously 
outlined hypothetical premise that Marines prior to 9/11 may have not expected to 
deploy, and never did deploy, and therefore we can test for continuation effects not 
relative to mobilization. Second, in order to test for occurrence, type, and frequency of 
mobilization, the variables themselves contain some correlation (although small) with 
each other.  For example, those that were mobilized twice (mob_2), may overlap with the 
variable measuring the deployment frequency of being mobilized 7–12 months 
(mob_bin2) and vice versa.  This will be overcome through various model specifications, 
which can help alleviate this limitation. 
D. SUMMARY 
The intent of this chapter was to provide source and background information on 
the data used in this study, provide depth in understanding the research scope and 
methodology and acknowledge relevant issues and concerns that have been considered 
when developing these statistical models.  The next chapter will discuss the specific 
variables used in the quantitative analysis.    
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VI. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
This chapter provides both an overview and description of the dependent and 
independent variables as identified in Table 3, and then presents the descriptive statistics 
and preliminary analysis.  Section A provides an overview of each variable, Section B 
discusses the dependant variable description, Section C describes the independent 
variables, Section E outlines the descriptive statistics, and Section F discusses the 
preliminary findings of this research. 
A. VARIABLE OVERVIEW 
The variables outlined in this chapter represent the final merged and coded data 
set used for the multivariate models.  Table 3 shows the overview of each variable.  
Table 3.   Overview of Each Variable 
Category Variable Description Variable Name
Variable
 Type Range 
DEPENDENT     
 
Retained 12 
 Months Beyond 6-Year 
Drilling Obligation 
ret_12mos Binary 1=Retained 0=otherwise 
INDEPENDENT     
Deployment Previously Deployed Overseas  oconus_deployed Binary 
1=Retained 
0=otherwise 
 Mobilized 1-6 Months mob_bin1 Binary 1=Mobilized 0=otherwise 
 Mobilized 7-12 Months mob_bin2 Binary 1=Mobilized 0=otherwise 
 Mobilized Twice mob2 Binary 1=Mobilized 0=otherwise 
Demographics Gender male Binary 1=Male 0=otherwise 
  female Binary 1=Female 0=otherwise 
 66
Category Variable Description Variable Name
Variable
 Type Range 
 Race white Binary 1=White 0=otherwise 
  black Binary 1=Black 0=otherwise 
  asian Binary 1=Asian 0=otherwise 
  other Binary 1=Other Race 0=otherwise 
 Marital Status single Binary 1=Never Married 0=otherwise 
  married Binary 1=Married 0=otherwise 
  divorced Binary 1=Divorced 0=otherwise 
 Dependants no_child_1plus Binary 1=At Least Child 0=otherwise 




AFQT afqt_low_quality Binary 1=If AFQT CAT 3B or 4 0=otherwise 
  afqt_high_quality Binary 1=If AFQT CAT 1 - 3A 0=otherwise 
 1st Class PFT Score pft1 Binary 1=1st Class Score 0=otherwise 
 2nd Class PFT Score pft2 Binary 1=2nd Class Score 0=otherwise 
 3rd Class PFT Score pft3 Binary 1=3rd Class Score 0=otherwise 
 PFT Failure pft_fail Binary 1=PFT Failure 0=otherwise 
 PFT Medically Exempt pft_med Binary 1=PFT Exempt/Medical 0=otherwise 
 Currently Deployed  (PFT Exempt) pft_deploy Binary 
1=PFT Exempt/deployed 
0=otherwise 
 Proficiency/Conduct Score pro_con Continuous 
Average 
Proficiency/Conduct Marks 
in Service (converted) 
Education Alternate High School Credential hs_alt Binary 
1=Alt High School 
0=otherwise 
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Category Variable Description Variable Name
Variable
 Type Range 
 High School Diploma hs_dg Binary 1=High School Diploma 0=otherwise 
 Any College Degree college_degree Binary 1=Any College Degree 0=otherwise 
Rank Private pvt Binary 1=if Private 0=otherwise 
 Private First Class pfc Binary 1=if PFC 0=otherwise 
 Lance Corporal lcpl Binary 1=if Lance Corporal 0=otherwise 
 Corporal cpl Binary 1=if Corporal 0=otherwise 
 Sergeant sgt Binary 1=if Sergeant 0=otherwise 
MGIB Usage MGIB Previously Used  During Enlistment mgib_prior Binary 
1=if MGIB previously used
0=otherwise 
 MGIB Currently  in Use mgib_current Binary 
1=if MGIB in current use 
0=otherwise 
Unit Type Marine Division div Binary 1=if div unit 0=otherwise 
 Marine Logistics Group mlg Binary 1=if mlg 0=otherwise 
 Marine Air Wing maw Binary 1=if maw 0=otherwise 
Geographic Regions 
(by Census Region) 
Midwest East 
IL, IN, MI, WI, OH midwest_e Binary 




MO, ND, NE, KS, SD, 
 MN, IA 
midwest_w Binary 1=if Regional State 0=otherwise 
 New England CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT new_eng Binary 
1=if Regional State 
0=otherwise 
 Mid Atlantic  NJ, NY, PA mid_atl Binary 




FL, GA, SC, NC, VA, 
 WV, DC, MD, DE 
south_atl Binary 1=if Regional State 0=otherwise 
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Category Variable Description Variable Name
Variable
 Type Range 
 South East KY, TN, MS, AL south_east Binary 
1=if Regional State 
0=otherwise 
 South East Central OK, AR, TX, LA south_east_c Binary 




AZ, NM, NV, UT, ID, 
CO, MT, WY 
west_mtn Binary 1=if Regional State 0=otherwise 
 West Pacific CA, HI, OR, WA, AK west_pac Binary 









B. DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
1. 12-Month Continuation 
The interest in obtaining 12-month continuation probabilities is derived from a 
variety of reasons.  First, Marine Corps manpower planners fundamentally base their 
staffing management models on a fiscal year basis and can better apply 12-month 
continuation results to their existing tools.  Second, as previously mentioned in the 
introduction and literature review, NPS reserve behavior poses unique and difficult 
challenges as it pertains to attrition and retention.  Therefore, for the purpose of this 
study, the dichotomous dependent variable ret_12mos (12-month continuation) will 
examine whether a reservist is still serving in the reserves 12 months beyond their 6-year 
drilling commitment.  As Table 3 shows, for those that stay, the variable = 1 and those 
that do not if = 0. 
C. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
1. Mobilization 
The unique relationship between deployment and mobilization presents 
challenges to reserve studies that investigate deployment effects.  However, this study is 
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easier to control for these differences between deployment and mobilization since Marine 
Corps NPS reservists primarily are involuntarily “mobilized as units” and are most often 
deployed in support of contingency operations.  This is in contrast to many other reserve 
branches that have high mobilization rates that do not involve serving overseas. 
Mobilization can elicit important information pertaining to reserve retention 
behavior.  As previous reserve studies suggest, mobilization frequency and type are 
important to consider, especially since mobilization may affect reservists differently 
given the increased burden on their primary civilian employment.  Loss rates among 
reservists have been linked to the specific characteristic of being mobilized for any period 
of time, or not being mobilized at all (Dolfini-Reed et al, 2005). Therefore, this thesis 
measures mobilization frequency and type by using four mobilization variables: (1) 
previously deployed overseas; (2) mobilized 1–6 months; (3) mobilized 7–12 months; 
and (4) mobilized twice. This analysis intends to utilize these variables to isolate and 
further assess specific time periods as they may relate to reservists’ expectations of 
mobilization and deployment. 
a. Previously Deployed Overseas 
This dichotomous variable indicates whether a person has previously 
deployed overseas in any capacity.  If an individual was mobilized and deployed overseas 
at any time during their enlistment, then this variable takes on a value of 1, and 0 if 
otherwise.  This variable is not intended to test for specific location effects, but rather the 
actual experience of ever deploying overseas.  To deploy overseas, regardless of location, 
presents numerous life challenges to family, civilian employment and various other life 
interruptions.  From the overall dataset, 44% of NPS reservists have deployed overseas at 
least once, with this number varying among the different periods of Pre-911, Overlap-
9/11, and Post-9/11.  
b. Mobilized (1–6 Months) 
This variable indicates whether an individual has mobilized 1–6 months 
and takes on a value of 1 if a person has been mobilized for a period of 1–6 months, and a 
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value of 0 if otherwise.  Drawn from the historical activation dates within the data, this 
variable represents the category of shorter mobilization lengths based on doctrinal 
deployment trends and patterns, which have existed specific to NPS reservists.  Previous 
research indicates that lengthy mobilization periods negatively affect retention in most 
cases, so it is valid to examine further how specific mobilization lengths influence 
continuation behavior (Dolfini-Reed & Bowling, 2010). 
c. Mobilized (7–12 Months) 
Similar to the variable mobilized 1–6 months, this variable takes on a 
value of 1 if a person has mobilized more that 6 months during their enlistment, and 0 if 
otherwise.  Those that have mobilized more than 6 months in this dataset comprise 43% 
of the population and represent the typical mobilization lengths currently occurring in 
SMCR units.  Interestingly, this frequency almost doubles in the Post- 9/11 period and 
will be discussed further in the preliminary results portion of this chapter.  Since the 
percentage of NPS personnel mobilized for more than 12 months is negligible, this 
variable will referred to as mobilized 7–12 months in this thesis. 
d. Mobilized Twice 
As previously mentioned, multiple mobilization frequencies are an 
important characteristic to consider when analyzing mobilizations amongst certain 
reserve types.  However, for NPS reservists, the Marine Corps is specifically interested in 
examining if a person has mobilized twice or more since the likelihood of NPS reservists 
mobilizing more than once in a 6-year period is not typical given the force generation 
model and a desired mobilized: dwell ratio of 1:5 (Price, 2011).   
2. Demographic Variables 
Naturally, demographic characteristics are of vital importance when analyzing 
military manpower related topics.  Within the scope of this thesis, gender, race, marital 




One dichotomous gender variable was created for female, which = 1 if a 
person is female, and = 0 if male.  Overall, the data indicates 97% of the NPS population 
is male.  Gender characteristics are extremely relevant and important to closely analyze 
as they may also be more affected by women’s decisions to bear children during 
increased mobilization expectations, especially during the Post-9/11 period. 
b. Race/Ethnicity 
Race/Ethnicity has been classified into four categories, White, Black, 
Asian, and Other.  The TFDW raw data did provide for the additional race categories of 
Pacific Islander and Native American races.  However, these comprised less than 1% of 
the population and were placed in the “other” race category.  Of additional note, 13% of 
reservists did not provide race/ethnic information.  The non-responders were combined 
with the “other” race category.  Lastly, the TFDW data did not indicate Hispanic 
ethnicity, which was most likely absorbed in the white and other race categories.  Price 
(2010) points out that, historically, minority races have been drawn to military service 
due to their individual perceptions regarding equal opportunity treatment; however, their 
tastes for service during intense mobilization may not be significantly linked to actual 
racial differences. 
c. Marital Status 
Marital status is grouped into three main categories: single, married, or 
divorced.  Two separate variables were created to define these categories, single and 
divorced.  The single marital status category for this dataset represents 68% of the total 
sample, while 30% are married, and 2% are divorced.  This distribution is largely 
affected by their average age, which is 25.8 years old at the continuation decision point.  
Most NPS reservists begin service as single, while approximately one-third will marry by 
the latter portions of their 6-year SMCR drilling obligation, as indicated in this dataset. 
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Marital status for reservists is interesting and relevant for retention 
analysis.  As Price (2010) indicated, there are unique family dependency dynamics 
specific to reserve participation that differs from the active component.  Reserve spouses 
may be more likely to pursue and maintain higher paying jobs without having to relocate 
as frequently, if at all, compared to spouses of active component personnel.  Therefore, 
the additional income of reserve participation may be less attractive to married reservists. 
d. Dependants 
Since 91% of NPS Marines in the overall dataset did not have children, 
while 6% had one child, 2% had two children, and less than 1% had over three children, a 
dichotomous variable was created for which = 1 if the number of children is 1 or greater, 
and = 0 otherwise.  Given the young age in the population of NPS reservists, determining 
effects of having 1 or more children is more conducive for this statistical analysis. 
Previous reserve studies, like Price (2010) and others have determined that 
the effect of children on reserve continuation is ambiguous at best and needs further 
analysis, especially since the increased demand for reservists to mobilize may pose 
unique challenges for those reservists with children, and more so, for those who are 
single parents.  On the other hand, married individuals with children may have greater 
need for additional income or enjoy the respite reserve service provides. 
e. Age 
The variable age is a continuous variable based on the date of observation.  
The average age for the raw NPS population data is 22.84 and 25.79 for those that have 
completed their 6-year drilling contracts.  Previous empirical reserve focused research 
has identified that age may negatively influence reservists’ propensity to stay as they 
begin to mature and take on competing social and civilian employment demands.  For 
example, most reservists develop competing career interests that make it difficult to 
continue serving in the reserves when they reach the end of their contracts (Dolfini-Reed 
& Bowling, 2010). 
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3. Military Performance Variables 
This category of variables will be used to describe the performance and ability 
related measures that may serve as proxies for a person’s military adaptability, 
motivation, and person-job fit within the organization, which may influence their 
continuation of service beyond their contract completion.  The Marine Corps maintains 
its own unique military culture and job performance standards, which may affect how 
reservists’ perceive their suitability to continue to serve based on their performance in the 
these areas. 
a. AFQT 
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores were grouped into two 
main categories: low quality AFQT score and high quality AFQT score.  Anyone falling 
into the AFQT categories of 1-3A was classified as “high quality scores,” whereas AFQT 
scores in categories 3B and below were classified as “low quality scores.”  Both variables 
are binary.  The primary justification for this approach was due to problematic categorical 
representation amongst the data.   
Previous research on the topic has found that the AFQT test scores among 
Marine Corps reservists have increased nearly 5% from 64.2 to 67.4 from Sept 2001 to 
Sept 2006 (Dolfini-Reed & McHugh, 2007).  This evidence is further supported by this 
NPS dataset where the population’s initial entry scores between 1997–2009 had an 
average AFQT score of 66 (category 2 or high quality score).  Further, high quality 
scores comprised 82.24% of scores in this full sample.  AFQT test scores appear highly 
relevant to use as predictor variables in this study since they may potentially signal an 
increase in civilian job opportunities and earning potential for those that have high 
quality scores, and thus impacting continuation rates (Price, 2010).  Potentially, 
individuals with higher AFQT scores are more likely to experience a large income loss 
during mobilization, which could serve as a deterrent to continued service in the SMCR. 
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b. PFT Score 
The Marine Corps Physical Fitness Score (PFT24) is strongly correlated 
with the indispensable aspect of leadership.  Culturally, many Marines who perform well 
on the PFT are perceived to be good overall performers within the Corps and possess the 
prerequisite characteristics of determination, discipline, and motivation in order to 
maintain strict physical fitness standards.  Certain performance levels on the PFT may 
help identify and indicate certain systematic differences of those who score well on the 
test and those who do not.  The PFT variables are binary and divided into 5 categories: 
first class PFT, second class PFT, third class PFT, medically excused from PFT, PFT 
failure, and PFT deployed.  The PFT Medical variable accounts for those scores in the 
data that represented individuals excused or injured preventing a Marine from taking the 
PFT.  Lastly, the PFT deployed variable accounts for those who are exempt from taking 
the PFT due to being in a deployed status.  The Marine Corps PFT scoring distribution25 
is outlined in Table 4. 
Table 4.   Marine Corps Physical Fitness Test Standards 
 
  Source: Marine Corps Order (MCO) P6100.12 
                                                 
24 The Marine Corps Physical Fitness Test (PFT) consists of a timed 3-mile run, crunches performed 
in a two-minute time limit, and the performing of dead-hang pull-ups on a stationary bar.  The maximum 
score in each category when totaled will equal 300: an 18:00 minute 3-mile run, 20 pull-ups, and 100 
crunches. 
25 Note: the PFT Score Table above excluded the age category of 46 and above, since that specific age 
group is not relevant to this study.  Most ages represented in the dataset are between 17-26 years. 
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c. Proficiency and Conduct Score 
For Marines below the rank of Sergeant, another indicator of job 
performance is their Proficiency (Pro) and Conduct (Con) Markings.  This score attempts 
to encompass numerous aspects of their military performance, ability, and character and 
conceivably may offer the most comprehensive measure of the overall military ability of 
an individual.  Per the Marine Corps Individual Records Administration Manual 
(IRAM)26 the assignment of proficiency marks takes into consideration the following 
individual traits: technical skills, specialized knowledge, leadership, and overall Marine 
skills such as battle skills testing (BST) results and professional military education. 
The assignment of conduct marks takes into account the following traits:  
military bearing, attitude/enthusiasm, reliability, positive influence on others, courtesy, 
adaptability, obedience, participation/cooperation, integrity, interest, and community 
activity. Acquiring high rated marks may signal a propensity to continue military service; 
however, it may also be a cue for susceptibility to leaving reserve service since their 
requisite skills sets may be in high demand in the civilian sector. 
Each variable (proficiency and conduct) is graded on a 5-point scale, and 
averages the total combined pro/con marks received during their entire enlistment period.  
Since they both are comprehensively examining military related traits, the two variables 
have been combined together on a 10-point scale, which provides an aggregate overall 
pro/con rating27.  There is some internal bias built into each pro/con rating because, as 
with any rating system, potential for subjectivity bias is always present. 
                                                 
26 The Individual Records Administration Manual (IRAM), Marine Corps Order (MCO) P1070.12K, 
issues guidance and compliance for all administration records, to include specific marking guidance to 
leaders as they pertain to proficiency and conduct markings for Corporals and below. Marines with average 
pro/con marks below 4.0 are not eligible for promotion and average marks for a Marine typically are 
around 4.4 in both categories. 
27 The 10.0 combined score was created by subtracting 4.0 from each score (i.e., those not 
reenlistment eligible) and then multiplying by 5.  Thus, a change from 4.4 to 4.5 in average proficiency 
scores would result in an increase of 1 point, while an increase in both proficiency and conduct scores from 
4.4 to 4.5 would result in an increase of 2 points on a 10-point scale. 
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d. Rank 
There are five binary rank variables for Private (Pvt), Private First Class 
(PFC), Lance Corporal (LCpl), Corporal (Cpl), and Sergeant (Sgt).  Ranks are inherently 
a function of performance and ability and those that are promoted to the rank of Cpl and 
Sgt may have a stronger propensity to continue service.  Further, it is important to note 
that the primary focus of rank effects will center around the ranks of Cpl and Sgt, since 
those Marines make up the preponderance of the population that manage to complete 
their 6-year drilling obligations.  In addition, Lance Corporals will most likely be 
ineligible for reenlistment when they reach 8 years of service due to service limitations 
that require achieving a minimum rank of Sergeant, which is difficult to achieve in only 2 
years.  Thus, Marines that continue beyond 6 years of service in the rank of Lance 
Corporal must be motivated by something other than long-term career aspirations. 
4. Education Benefits 
a. Montgomery G.I. Bill Usage (MGIB) 
An important benefit that has been analyzed in previous military research 
is the Montgomery G.I. Bill.  The G.I. Bill has been used as a principal sales tactic to 
entice military-age civilians to join the military.  There were two binary variables used to 
consider education incentive effects in this analysis.  The first binary variable mgib_prior 
determines if there has been any previous use of MGIB benefits during their enlistment, 
even if the benefits were stopped at any point in time.  The second variable, mgib_current 
indicates if the person is in current receipt of any MGIB payments.   
The primary rationale behind testing prior MGIB usage is perhaps a 
person who previously used the benefits several years ago may have a lesser propensity 
to continue service than someone who is currently using MGIB benefits or has never used 
them.  Further, this variable may have a stronger effect during certain time periods, such 
as the Pre- and Post-9/11 periods, where expectations were the most clear about 
mobilizing, and reservists enlisted to utilize these educational benefits.  These effects 
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may help explain their relationship with continuation rates, and whether their service in 
the Marine Corps Reserve was educationally motivated. 
5. Unit Type 
All SMCR Marines can be doctrinally grouped into four main organizational 
categories as Figure 10 depicts: 4th Marine Division (DIV), 4th Marine Air Wing 
(MAW), Marine Logistics Group (MLG), and Mobilization Command.   
 
 
Source: USMC Concepts & Programs Manual, 2010 
Figure 15.   Marine Forces Reserve Unit Types  
Since this thesis is only interested in analyzing NPS reservists, the unit types that 
are relevant are the DIV, MAW, and MLG, since Mobilization Command is not normally 
sourced with a significant number of NPS reservists.  The Mobilization Command 
contains less than 1% of the total NPS population and therefore was excluded for that  
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reason.  In addition, force units such as Anglico, Intelligence Support Battalion, and Civil 
Affairs Group contained less than 3% of the total NPS population and were similarly 
excluded from this analysis. 
To further isolate continuation effects, it is appropriate to control for systematic 
differences, which may occur among these three unit types.  For example, a Marine 
Division Unit, which predominately accounts for ground combat arms elements, 
possesses unique variations in culture, training, and work climate as compared to the 
Marine Air Wing and Marine Logistics Group, which consist of all combat service 
support functions.  Interpersonal relationships, unit cohesion, and leadership all vary 
across these unit types.  Therefore, to examine reserve participation behavior without 
considering the organizational differences among unit types would be simply one-
dimensional.  Reserve aviation units typically have more funding and are culturally 
known to have a higher quality of life due to their proximity to large bases and airfields 
(Price, 2010).  Additionally, some occupational fields that primarily serve within air wing 
units are in highly specialized fields that may or may not be in demand in their local 
civilian communities and can potentially affect continuation behavior as well.  Moreover, 
instead of choosing to serve in the reserves based on certain occupational interests, many 
reservists may self select and choose reserve service based on “geographical 
convenience” to units that are within close proximity to their homes.  This can be 
problematic and can mask continuation effects because the reservists’ entry decisions 
were based more on geographic convenience alone, and not on a good person-job fit. 
6. Geographic Locations 
As Dolfini-Reed and McHugh (2007) indicate, the geographic distribution of 
reservists has not shifted since the September 2001–September 2006 period.  Therefore, 9 
dichotomous geographic variables have been created to use with the Census Bureau’s 9 





Source: Census Bureau’s Geographic Areas Reference Manual, 2005 
Figure 16.   Census Regions and Divisions of the United States. 
Table 3 described the specific variable name and state distribution of the nine 
geographic regions.  Although numerous important characteristics can be examined for 
the nine regions, which extend beyond the scope of this analysis, their main use in the 
models is to isolate potential propensity within certain geographic areas of the country. 
For example, patriotism and community support for the military service varies across 
areas of the United States.    
7. Unemployment Rate 
The variable for the seasonally adjusted state unemployment rate is a continuous 
variable based on an individual’s home state and drilling residence during the monthly 
sequence observation. Based on the Annual Cost of Living (ACOL) Model, a rise in 
unemployment may affect a person’s decision to remain in service for pecuniary benefits 
(Price, 2010).    
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D. SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided an overview of the variables, along with a discussion of 
the utility of each variable used in this analysis.  The independent variable has been 
described as a dichotomous variable indicating a 1 if the reservist has completed his/her 
6-year drilling contract and continued to participate 12 months beyond that completion 
date, and 0 otherwise.  The specific dependent variables included in this study are: 
mobilization variables, race, gender, marital status, dependant status, education, military 
performance variables, unit type, geographic region, and unemployment rate variables.  
These variables provide the framework for the next chapter, which provides descriptive 
statistics and preliminary data analysis. 
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VII. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND PRELIMINARY DATA 
ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the descriptive and summary statistics. 
As previously discussed, when examining this entire period from Fiscal Year 1998–2009, 
it will be important to restrict the specific periods that occurred within this turbulent span 
of time.  Since September 11, 2001, and the onset of Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, 
reserve utilization and mobilizations have potentially affected continuation rates.  The 
following series of tables provide descriptive data for the four main periods covered by 
the data: the full sample and the Pre-9/11, Overlap-9/11, and Post-9/11 time period 
restrictions. 
A. FULL SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for the full sample.  There are three main 
categories provided: the percent distribution of sample (column 1), the continuation 
percentage by category (column 2), and the percent distribution of the continuation group 
(column 3).  As previously discussed, this thesis is focused on the “waterfall period,” 
therefore, the percent distribution in column 1 is based on those NPS Marines who have 
completed their 6-year drilling obligations and are currently at their decision point to 
continue service.  Column 1 represents the percent make-up of those who completed their 
contracts. The continuation in column 2 is the break down by category of the percentage 
of NPS Marines who continued.  Finally, column 3 is the percent make-up of NPS 
Marines who have continued participating in SMCR units 12 months beyond their 
contract completion. For instance, out of the total sample of NPS Marines that continued, 
the percentage distribution can be described as 97.20% male and 2.80% female (column 
3) as compared to 97.09% male and 2.91% female with originally completed contracts 
(column 1).  As expected, these percent make-ups are similar, relative to the number of 
completed contracts verses the number who continued, because the continuation group is 
a subsample and therefore maintains the general characteristics and is representative of  
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those who completed their contracts.  Those categories with differences in percentage 
make-up will be analyzed further to determine whether the given categorical 
characteristics affect continuation rates. 
It should be noted that there existed some missing observations in some 
categories, albeit limited.  Therefore, not all general categories tally to 100%.  For 
instance, marital status can be accounted for in 99.96% of the data with an additional 
0.04% with unrecorded marital status.  These missing observations are infrequent and the 
analysis will be performed on the available data. 










 Distribution of 
Continuation 
Group 
Deployment Variables       
   Previously Deployed Overseas 44.04% 9.08% 44.04% 
   Mobilized 1-6 Months 8.71% 2.11% 10.22% 
   Mobilized 7-12 Months 43.48% 9.09% 43.98% 
   Mobilized Twice 12.41% 3.43% 16.61% 
Demographic Characteristics  
   Gender  
      Male 97.09% 20.09% 97.20% 
      Female 2.91% 0.58% 2.80% 
   Race  
      White 73.29% 14.27% 69.05% 
      Black 8.43% 2.14% 10.33% 
      Asian 4.26% 0.78% 3.78% 
      Other 14.02% 3.48% 16.84% 
   Marital Status  
      Single 68.33% 14.23% 68.92% 
      Married 29.84% 5.93% 28.71% 
      Divorced 1.79% 0.49% 2.35% 
   Dependants  
      No Children 78.32% 15.93% 77.08% 
      At Least 1 Child 21.68% 4.74% 22.92% 
   Age 25.79 N/A N/A
   Education  
   Alternate High School Diploma 2.89% 0.67% 3.25% 
   High School Diploma 89.82% 18.46% 89.61% 
   Any College Degree 6.87% 1.47% 7.12% 
                                                 










 Distribution of 
Continuation 
Group 
Military Performance Variables  
  AFQT  
   AFQT Low Quality Score 18.95% 4.03% 19.77% 
         (Category 3b or 4 )  
   AFQT High Quality Score 79.86% 16.36% 80.23% 
         (Category 1 - 3a)  
PFT Score  
         1st Class Score 38.23% 9.38% 46.23% 
         2nd Class Score 29.94% 5.82% 28.70% 
         3rd Class Score 9.70% 1.47% 7.24% 
         PFT Failure 9.89% 1.37% 6.74% 
         Currently Deployed (exempt) 10.05% 2.17% 10.68% 
   Proficiency/Conduct Score 4.74 N/A N/A 
   Rank  
          Private (Pvt) 1.66% 0.33% 1.61% 
          Private First Class (PFC) 2.58% 0.44% 2.15% 
          Lance Corporal (LCpl) 14.65% 2.41% 11.64% 
          Corporal (Cpl) 56.34% 10.73% 51.91% 
          Sergeant (Sgt) 24.69% 6.73% 32.54% 
Education Benefits  
   MGIB Usage (post-9/11 only)  
      MGIB used anytime during enlistment 3.10% 0.43% 2.07% 
      MGIB was currently being used  39.22% 8.44% 40.84% 
Unit Type  
    Division Unit (DIV) 53.08% 10.52% 53.89% 
    Logistics Unit (MLG) 27.74% 5.27% 27.01% 
    Air Wing Unit (MAW) 15.51% 3.73% 19.10% 
Geographic  Regions  
   Midwest East 13.72% 2.64% 12.85% 
IL, IN, MI, WI, OH  
   Midwest West 4.80% 0.91% 4.44% 
MO, ND, NE, KS, SD, MN, IA  
   New England 5.01% 0.95% 4.62% 
CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT  
   Mid Atlantic 13.74% 2.87% 13.96% 
NJ, NY, PA  
   South Atlantic 18.43% 3.94% 19.19% 
FL, GA, SC, NC, VA, WV, DC, MD, DE  
   South East 5.92% 1.01% 4.90% 
KY, TN, MS, AL  
   South East Central 13.36% 2.78% 13.53% 
OK, AR, TX, LA  
   West Mountain 5.18% 1.03% 5.03% 
AZ, NM, NV, UT, ID, CO, MT, WY  
   West Pacific 19.44% 4.41% 21.48% 
CA, HI, OR, WA, AK  










 Distribution of 
Continuation 
Group 
N= 34051 34051 34051 
 
B. PRE-9/11 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
As Table 6 indicates, the Pre-9/11 time period had virtually no mobilizations to 
account for and therefore the numbers are too small to consider or gain any interpretive 
value.  What this table does provide is an accurate snapshot for all other nondeployment-
related variables in the sample (with the exception of MGIB usage, which was obtained 
beginning in FY 2002). Table 6 represents the restricted sample of the Pre-9/11 time 
period. 









 Distribution of 
Continuation 
Group 
Deployment Variables      
   Previously Deployed Overseas 0.26% 0.12% 0.67% 
   Mobilized 1-6 Months 0.02% 0.01% 0.06% 
   Mobilized 7-12 Months 0.02% 0.02% 0.12% 
   Mobilized Twice 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Demographic Characteristics      
   Gender      
      Male 98.40% 17.42% 97.92% 
      Female 1.60% 0.37% 2.08% 
   Race      
      White 74.27% 12.38% 69.60% 
      Black 8.29% 1.74% 9.77% 
      Asian 3.61% 0.55% 3.11% 
      Other 13.84% 3.12% 17.52% 
   Marital Status      
      Single 71.43% 12.69% 71.35% 
      Married 26.99% 4.75% 26.70% 
      Divorced 1.54% 0.35% 1.95% 
   Dependants      
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Continuation 
Group 
      At Least 1 Child 29.61% 5.65% 31.75% 
   Age 25.76 (2.00)29 N/A N/A 
   Education      
   Alternate High School Diploma 2.52% 0.54% 3.05% 
   High School Diploma 90.43% 15.92% 89.55% 
   Any College Degree 6.84% 1.31% 7.39% 
Military Performance Variables      
  AFQT      
   AFQT Low Quality Score 17.73% 3.23% 18.13% 
         (Category 3b or 4 )      
   AFQT High Quality Score 82.24% 14.57% 81.87% 
         (Category 1 - 3a)      
   PFT Score      
         1st Class Score 32.73% 7.41% 45.05% 
         2nd Class Score 36.47% 6.13% 37.25% 
         3rd Class Score 14.72% 1.87% 11.36% 
         PFT Failure 8.96% 0.91% 5.55% 
         Currently Deployed (exempt)     0.00% 
   Proficiency/Conduct Score 5.24 N/A N/A 
   Rank      
          Private (Pvt) 2.79% 0.48% 2.69% 
          Private First Class (PFC) 3.19% 0.43% 2.44% 
          Lance Corporal (LCpl) 12.27% 1.54% 8.67% 
          Corporal (Cpl) 57.17% 9.07% 50.98% 
          Sergeant (Sgt) 24.35% 6.19% 34.80% 
Education Benefits      
   MGIB Usage (post-9/11 only)      
      MGIB used anytime during enlistment 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
      MGIB was currently being used  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Unit Type      
    Division Unit (DIV) 52.12% 9.09% 53.65% 
    Logistics Unit (MLG) 28.01% 4.48% 26.41% 
    Air Wing Unit (MAW) 16.65% 3.38% 19.94% 
Geographic Regions 
(by Census Region)      
   Midwest East 14.18% 2.01% 11.35% 
IL, IN, MI, WI, OH      
   Midwest West 5.00% 0.78% 4.42% 
MO, ND, NE, KS, SD, MN, IA      
   New England 5.41% 0.92% 5.21% 
CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT      
   Mid Atlantic 12.82% 2.52% 14.23% 
NJ, NY, PA      
   South Atlantic 17.92% 3.56% 20.12% 
                                                 










 Distribution of 
Continuation 
Group 
FL, GA, SC, NC, VA, WV, DC, MD, DE      
   South East 5.80% 0.93% 5.28% 
KY, TN, MS, AL      
   South East Central 13.60% 2.53% 14.29% 
OK, AR, TX, LA      
   West Mountain 4.88% 0.78% 4.42% 
AZ, NM, NV, UT, ID, CO, MT, WY      
   West Pacific 19.95% 3.66% 20.67% 
CA, HI, OR, WA, AK      
Unemployment Rate 4.36% N/A N/A 
N= 9206 9206 9206 
 
C. OVERLAP-9/11 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
As Table 7 specifies, the Overlap-9/11 time period did have significant 
mobilization activity. The main focus when analyzing this time period is that increases in 
mobilizations during this time period vs. the pre-9/11 time period could be affecting the 
continuation rates based on the non-expectation to deploy at time of enlistment.  Table 7 
represents the restricted sample of the Overlap-9/11 time period.  









 Distribution of 
Continuation 
Group 
Deployment Variables    
   Previously Deployed Overseas 51.21% 10.08% 46.53% 
   Mobilized 1-6 Months 14.37% 3.44% 15.83% 
   Mobilized 7-12 Months 50.10% 10.25% 47.09% 
   Mobilized Twice 12.15% 3.11% 14.28% 
Demographic Characteristics    
   Gender    
      Male 96.67% 21.11% 97.02% 
      Female 3.33% 0.65% 2.98% 
   Race    
      White 71.50% 14.44% 66.37% 
      Black 9.29% 2.57% 11.81% 
      Asian 4.54% 0.91% 4.18% 










 Distribution of 
Continuation 
Group 
   Marital Status    
      Single 67.81% 15.01% 69.05% 
      Married 30.40% 6.25% 28.73% 
      Divorced 1.74% 0.48% 2.22% 
   Dependants    
      No Children 81.16% 17.30% 79.50% 
      At Least 1 Child 18.84% 4.46% 20.50% 




   Education    
   Alternate High School Diploma 2.88% 0.71% 3.27% 
   High School Diploma 89.77% 19.47% 89.75% 
   Any College Degree 6.96% 1.51% 6.96% 
Military Performance Variables    
  AFQT    
   AFQT Low Quality Score 20.17% 4.50% 21.00% 
         (Category 3b or 4 )    
   AFQT High Quality Score 78.43% 16.92% 79.00% 
         (Category 1 - 3a)    
   PFT Score    
         1st Class Score 39.36% 10.01% 46.07% 
         2nd Class Score 29.23% 6.17% 28.41% 
         3rd Class Score 9.26% 1.61% 7.40% 
         PFT Failure 10.29% 1.66% 7.66% 
         Currently Deployed (exempt) 11.42% 2.21% 10.16% 
   Proficiency/Conduct Score 4.62 N/A N/A 
   Rank    
          Private (Pvt) 1.56% 0.37% 1.71% 
          Private First Class (PFC) 2.64% 0.53% 2.42% 
          Lance Corporal (LCpl) 16.43% 3.01% 13.82% 
          Corporal (Cpl) 55.79% 11.32% 52.04% 
          Sergeant (Sgt) 23.54% 6.51% 29.91% 
Education Benefits    
   MGIB Usage (post-9/11 only)    
     MGIB used anytime during enlistment 3.37% 0.36% 1.63% 
      MGIB was currently being used  57.19% 12.45% 57.24% 
Unit Type    
    Division Unit (DIV) 52.73% 10.94% 53.43% 
    Logistics Unit (MLG) 27.91% 5.48% 26.74% 
    Air Wing Unit (MAW) 15.35% 4.06% 19.83% 
Geographic Regions 
(by Census Region)    
   Midwest East 13.37% 2.91% 13.44% 
                                                 










 Distribution of 
Continuation 
Group 
IL, IN, MI, WI, OH    
   Midwest West 4.57% 0.92% 4.23% 
MO, ND, NE, KS, SD, MN, IA    
   New England 4.60% 0.85% 3.93% 
CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT    
   Mid Atlantic 14.19% 2.83% 13.11% 
NJ, NY, PA    
   South Atlantic 18.94% 4.07% 18.83% 
FL, GA, SC, NC, VA, WV, DC, MD, DE    
   South East 5.95% 1.07% 4.95% 
KY, TN, MS, AL    
   South East Central 13.11% 2.93% 13.57% 
OK, AR, TX, LA    
   West Mountain 5.29% 1.24% 5.75% 
AZ, NM, NV, UT, ID, CO, MT, WY    
   West Pacific 19.59% 4.80% 22.19% 
CA, HI, OR, WA, AK    
Unemployment Rate 5.32% N/A N/A 
N= 18027 18027 18027 
 
D. POST-9/11 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
As Table 8 describes, the Post-9/11 time period had the most significant 
mobilization activity of all the time periods. However, the limited data available during 
this time period for analysis is evident in the number of observations, 6,818 vs. the 
Overlap Period of 18,027 observations.  During this time period, NPS reservists may 
expect more imminent deployment at the point of enlistment.  A reflection of this can be 
observed in the data distinguishing it from the previous time periods (Pre-9/11 and 
Overlap-9/11) both among the actual percentage deployed, as well as among the 
percentage that continued service.  Table 8 represents the restricted sample of the Post-














 Distribution of 
Continuation 
Group 
Deployment Variables       
   Previously Deployed Overseas 84.20% 18.51% 85.62% 
   Mobilized 1-6 Months 5.49% 1.42% 6.57% 
   Mobilized 7-12 Months 84.66% 18.28% 84.36% 
   Mobilized Twice 29.85% 8.93% 41.23% 
Demographic Characteristics    
   Gender    
      Male 96.45% 20.99% 96.89% 
      Female 3.55% 0.67% 3.11% 
   Race    
      White 76.71% 16.37% 75.56% 
      Black 6.35% 1.53% 7.04% 
      Asian 4.41% 0.75% 3.45% 
      Other 12.53% 3.02% 13.95% 
   Marital Status    
      Single 65.49% 14.27% 65.88% 
      Married 32.22% 6.69% 30.87% 
      Divorced 2.26% 0.70% 3.25% 
   Dependants    
      No Children 81.52% 17.42% 80.43% 
      At Least 1 Child 18.48% 4.24% 19.57% 




   Education    
   Alternate High School Diploma 3.27% 0.73% 3.41% 
   High School Diploma 89.13% 19.21% 89.30% 
   Any College Degree 6.64% 1.57% 7.24% 
Military Performance Variables    
  AFQT    
   AFQT Low Quality Score 17.37% 3.89% 18.34% 
         (Category 3b or 4 )    
   AFQT High Quality Score 80.43% 17.31% 81.66% 
         (Category 1 - 3a)    
   PFT Score    
         1st Class Score 42.67% 10.37% 47.87% 
         2nd Class Score 22.98% 4.49% 20.72% 
         3rd Class Score 4.08% 0.56% 2.57% 
         PFT Failure 10.06% 1.20% 5.55% 
         Currently Deployed (exempt) 20.02% 4.99% 23.02% 
   Proficiency/Conduct Score 4.39 N/A N/A 
   Rank    
          Private (Pvt) 0.38% 0.03% 0.14% 
          Private First Class (PFC) 1.58% 0.23% 1.08% 
                                                 










 Distribution of 
Continuation 
Group 
          Lance Corporal (LCpl) 13.13% 1.98% 9.14% 
          Corporal (Cpl) 58.15% 11.40% 52.61% 
          Sergeant (Sgt) 28.19% 8.02% 37.03% 
Education Benefits    
   MGIB Usage (post -9/11 only)    
      MGIB used anytime during enlistment 6.56% 1.20% 5.55% 
      MGIB was currently being used  44.66% 9.23% 42.59% 
Unit Type    
    Division Unit (DIV) 55.29% 11.32% 55.38% 
    Logistics Unit (MLG) 26.91% 5.81% 28.41% 
    Air Wing Unit (MAW) 14.39% 3.31% 16.21% 
Geographic Regions 
(by Census Region)    
   Midwest East 14.02% 2.79% 12.93% 
IL, IN, MI, WI, OH    
   Midwest West 5.12% 1.09% 5.03% 
MO, ND, NE, KS, SD, MN, IA    
   New England 5.56% 1.25% 5.78% 
CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT    
   Mid Atlantic 13.80% 3.43% 15.92% 
NJ, NY, PA    
   South Atlantic 17.78% 4.12% 19.12% 
FL, GA, SC, NC, VA, WV, DC, MD, DE    
   South East 6.01% 0.94% 4.35% 
KY, TN, MS, AL    
   South East Central 13.71% 2.71% 12.59% 
OK, AR, TX, LA    
   West Mountain 5.32% 0.82% 3.81% 
AZ, NM, NV, UT, ID, CO, MT, WY    
   West Pacific 18.33% 4.41% 20.48% 
CA, HI, OR, WA, AK    
Unemployment Rate  6.97% N/A N/A 
N= 6818 6818 6818 
 
E. TIME PERIOD COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 
The descriptive statistics in Table 9 amplifies the variation in continuation 
percentages across time periods.  Again, the Pre-9/11 time period has minimal 
interpretive value on continuation percentages and mobilization due to the near absence 
of mobilization of NPS reservists during that time period.  The Overlap-9/11 and the 
Post-9/11 periods do present an interesting increase in the percentage of people who have 
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mobilized.  These continuation percentages represent those reservists who have 
completed their contract who: (a) Continued for another 12 months and (b) Fall under the 
specified variable category.  For example, 18.51% of reservists completing their contract 
continued for another 12 months and at some point deployed at least once overseas.  
Table 9 outlines this continuation rate comparison by time period. 














Deployment Variables    
   Previously Deployed Overseas 0.12% 10.08% 18.51% 
   Mobilized 1-6 Months 0.01% 3.44% 1.42% 
   Mobilized 7-12 Months 0.02% 10.25% 18.28% 
   Mobilized Twice 0.00% 3.11% 8.93% 
Demographic Characteristics    
   Gender    
      Male 17.42% 21.11% 20.99% 
      Female 0.37% 0.65% 0.67% 
   Race    
      White 12.38% 14.44% 16.37% 
      Black 1.74% 2.57% 1.53% 
      Asian 0.55% 0.91% 0.75% 
      Other 3.12% 3.84% 3.02% 
   Marital Status    
      Single 12.69% 15.01% 14.27% 
      Married 4.75% 6.25% 6.69% 
      Divorced 0.35% 0.48% 0.70% 
   Dependants    
      No Children 12.14% 17.30% 17.42% 
      At Least 1 Child 5.65% 4.46% 4.24% 
   Age N/A N/A N/A 
     
   Education    
   Alternate High School Diploma 0.54% 0.71% 0.73% 
   High School Diploma 15.92% 19.47% 19.21% 
   Any College Degree 1.31% 1.51% 1.57% 
Military Performance Variables    
  AFQT    
   AFQT Low Quality Score 3.23% 4.50% 3.89% 
         (Category 3b or 4 )    
   AFQT High Quality Score 14.57% 16.92% 17.31% 
         (Category 1 - 3a)    
   PFT Score    















         2nd Class Score 6.13% 6.17% 4.49% 
         3rd Class Score 1.87% 1.61% 0.56% 
         PFT Failure 0.91% 1.66% 1.20% 
         Currently Deployed (exempt) 0.00% 2.21% 4.99% 
   Proficiency/Conduct Score N/A N/A N/A 
   Rank    
          Private (Pvt) 0.48% 0.37% 0.03% 
          Private First Class (PFC) 0.43% 0.53% 0.23% 
          Lance Corporal (LCpl) 1.54% 3.01% 1.98% 
          Corporal (Cpl) 9.07% 11.32% 11.40% 
          Sergeant (Sgt) 6.19% 6.51% 8.02% 
Education Benefits    
   MGIB Usage (post-9/11 only)    
      MGIB used anytime during enlistment 0.00% 0.36% 1.20% 
      MGIB was currently being used  0.00% 12.45% 9.23% 
Unit Type    
    Division Unit (DIV) 9.09% 10.94% 11.32% 
    Logistics Unit (MLG) 4.48% 5.48% 5.81% 
    Air Wing Unit (MAW) 3.38% 4.06% 3.31% 
Geographic Regions 
(by Census Region)    
   Midwest East 2.01% 2.91% 2.79% 
IL, IN, MI, WI, OH    
   Midwest West 0.78% 0.92% 1.09% 
MO, ND, NE, KS, SD, MN, IA    
   New England 0.92% 0.85% 1.25% 
CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT    
   Mid Atlantic 2.52% 2.83% 3.43% 
NJ, NY, PA    
   South Atlantic 3.56% 4.07% 4.12% 
FL, GA, SC, NC, VA, WV, DC, MD, DE    
   South East 0.93% 1.07% 0.94% 
KY, TN, MS, AL    
   South East Central 2.53% 2.93% 2.71% 
OK, AR, TX, LA    
   West Mountain 0.78% 1.24% 0.82% 
AZ, NM, NV, UT, ID, CO, MT, WY    
   West Pacific 3.66% 4.80% 4.41% 
CA, HI, OR, WA, AK    
Unemployment Rate  N/A N/A N/A 
N= 9206 18027 6818 
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F. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
1. Mobilization by Time Period 
As can be determined from the descriptive statistics in Tables 6, 7, and 8, 
mobilizations have been increasing over time as a result of significant world events such 
as September 11, 2001, and the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.  Figure 17 provides a 
visual representation of mobilization data from these time periods. 
 
 
Source: TFDW Data, Author 
Figure 17.   Mobilizations by Time Periods 
As previously discussed, the NPS populations for the Pre-9/11 time period had 
virtually no mobilization or deployment of any type or length; whereas, during the 
Overlap-9/11 period about 50% of personnel have been deployed at least once, and the 
most significant length of deployment fell within the range of 7–12 months.  By the Post-
9/11 period, the percent mobilized had increased to well over 80%.  Similar increases can  
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be seen in the other categories and by the Post-9/11 period, about 30% of NPS personnel 
had mobilized twice.  This increase in mobilization may have an effect on continuation 
rates. 
2. Mobilization Versus Continuation 
After analyzing Figure 17, it is important to consider the actual continuation 
percentages within these mobilization categories.  Figure 18 analyzes the continuation 
percentages across these variables for the three distinct time periods (Pre-9/11, Overlap-
9/11, and Post-9/11 time periods). 
 
 
  Source: TFDW Data, Author 
Figure 18.   Mobilizations Versus Continuation Percentage by Time Period 
It appears that continuation percentages across mobilization types (Full Sample) 
are quite low and further analysis may illuminate whether there is a negative correlation 
between mobilization and continuation. However, the post-9/11 period appears 
significantly different from the general “full sample” or other time periods (Pre-9/11 and 
Overlap-9/11), suggesting that expectations during these time periods may be 
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systematically different.  Consequently, mobilization during the post-9/11 period may not 
have the same effect on continuation rates as mobilization during other time periods. 
Further regression analysis will seek to clarify this. 
3. Continuation by Other Explanatory Characteristics 
a. Continuation Percentages by Demographics and Time Period 
Now that the importance of considering mobilization has been established, 
we should assess other key factors that may affect continuation rates.  Demographics 
trends provide insight into subculture patterns in general and may lend key information 
whether continuation rates connected to particular patterns.  Figure 19 provides a 
continuation percentage composite for all three key time periods. 
 
 
 Source: TFDW Data, Author 
Figure 19.   Continuation Percentages by Demographics and Time Period 
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These continuation percentages, defined by demographic characteristics 
and time period, represent continuation trends occurring over the Pre-9/11, Overlap-9/11, 
and Post-9/11 time periods.  Overall most demographic categories appeared to increase 
slightly in continuation percentage over time.  However, this does not signify that any 
particular demographic has a positive/negative correlation with continuing service.  
Therefore, further regression analysis is needed to determine this and will be discussed in 
the regression results of this thesis.  
b. Military Performance Variables and Continuation 
Aside from demographics, it is assumed that military performance 
variables may help to enlighten certain factors that may affect continuation rate behavior 
for NPS reservists.  As previously mentioned, these variables may signal certain key 
characteristics of a person’s military adaptability, motivation, and person-job fit within 
the organization and thus contributing to the decision to continue participating in the 
SMCR unit based upon these key identifiers.  Figure 20 graphically represents 




Source: TFDW Data, Author 
Figure 20.   Continuation Percentages by Military Performance Variables  
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The distribution by period and military categories reveal continuation 
trends over the Pre-9/11, Overlap-9/11, and Post-9/11 periods.  Overall, continuation 
percentages appeared to remain constant over time for some categories.  Categories such 
as AFQT High Quality, 1st Class PFT Scores, and the rank of Sergeant experienced 
increases in continuation over time.  As an exception, continuation decreased for those 
with 2nd Class PFT Scores.  
c. Geographic Regions and Continuation 
Scrutinizing continuation rates by geographic regions will be useful in 
interpreting reserve behavior.  Different areas of the country may have different political 
affiliations, varying degrees of patriotic support for those serving in the military, as well 
as varying economic and civilian job markets, which may potentially affect a reservist’s 
taste for military service.  Although an in-depth analysis of various geographic effects is 
well beyond the scope of this thesis, it is a sensible to control for region in the 
multivariate models.  Figure 21 represents a visual portrayal of continuation percentage 
across the three time periods (Pre-9/11, Overlap-9/11, and the Post-9/11 period) for the 




Source: TFDW Data, Author 
Figure 21.   Continuation Percentages by Geographic Region Variables 
Overall, most geographic regions had higher continuation rates over time.  
Some exceptions are depicted for the South East and West Mountain regions, which 
appear to increase slightly during the Overlap-9/11 period but decrease back to Pre-9/11 
levels for the Post-9/11 Period. The regression analysis below will examine whether 
region is significantly associated with continuation behavior.  
G. SUMMARY 
The descriptive statistics presented in this chapter outlined important key factors 
associated with NPS continuation rates.  It highlighted the fact that NPS reserve “force 
utilization” has increased dramatically from before September 11, 2001 to the Post-9/11 
period and appears to be linked to continuation rate patterns.  Specifically, these trends 
for continuation rates that occurred across the Pre-9/11, Overlap-9/11, and Post-9/11 time 
periods, appear to be linked to mobilization type and frequency. 
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VIII. STATISTICAL MODEL 
The approach used to test the effects of mobilization on 12-month NPS Marine 
Corps Reserve continuation will be to utilize a binary response model discussed in this 
chapter.  Section A will describe the analytical method in detail and Section B will 
describe the mechanics of the multivariate probit regressions used in this analysis. 
A. ANALYTICAL METHOD 
All models performed in this thesis are probit models, which are nonlinear 
regression models specifically designed for a binary dependent variable.  The theoretical 
probability model of continuation given the explanatory variables is as follows 
(Wooldridge, 2009, p.575–576): 
)...()|1( 22110 kk xxxFxyP    
where: 
y = 1: dependent variable of continuation 12-months beyond contract completion 
x: independent explanatory variables as given according to the different models 





dvvzzF )()()(    
where the standard normal density is : )2/(exp)2()( 22/1 zzz    
βi: coefficient of regression for the i variable based on maximum likelihood 
These probit models will provide the probability for continuing 12-months in the 
SMCR units beyond the end of the 6-year drilling contract based on the explanatory 
variables.  The probabilities of the outcomes may fall outside the 0-1 interval in a general 
linear probability model making the probit model superior.   
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B. MULTIVARIATE PROBIT REGRESSION MODELS 
This analysis will utilize one full sample unrestricted model and three restricted 
time period models to isolate for particular time period effects during the Pre-9/11, 
Overlap-9/11, and Post-9/11 periods.  As previously mentioned, due to correlation among 
the mobilization variables, for each of the restricted models tested there will be four sub-
models, which will test the effects of the four mobilization variables.   
Since the key concern of the research is centered on the specific mobilization 
effects associated with continuation, the primary independent variables will be: (1) 
previously deployed overseas, (2) mobilized 1–6 months, (3) mobilized 7–12 months, and 
(4) mobilized twice.  In addition to these mobilization variables, some specific models 
will incorporate an interaction variable for being previously deployed overseas and 
mobilized twice.  Ideally, this will elucidate the mutual versus individual effects between 
these variables.   For clarity, all other explanatory variables (demographics, military 
performance, etc.) will be further defined at the conclusion of the model specification 
section. 
1. Model 1: Full Sample Model 
The primary purpose of the model using the full sample is to specifically analyze 
the overall period effects.  Therefore, it utilizes dummy period variables that will account 
for the Overlap-9/11, and Post-9/11 time periods (compared to the Pre-9/11 base group).  
This model is not specifically considering the detailed approach in testing for varying 
effects between the mobilization variables, but rather serves to capture the necessity of 
analyzing this sample in three distinct time periods.  Model 1A is specified as follows: 
Model 1A 
)) (  11/9(
)  11/9((












Additionally, the variable of previously deployed overseas is included in Model 
1B to determine whether mobilization affects continuation rates; the distinct variables 
that test for magnitude and frequency of mobilization are omitted from this 
comprehensive full sample view.   Model 1B is specified as follows: 
Model 1B 
)) ()  ((







The above model description only details the most salient variables.  As 
previously stated, the other key explanatory variables (30 additional variables 
considered) are detailed at the conclusion of the model specifications within this chapter 
(see Table 10), which further describes the various demographic and military 
performance variables. 
2. Model 2: Pre-9/11 Time Period 
Specifically, the key factor in Model 2 is the absence of deployment during this 
time period.  As highlighted in the descriptive statistics, mobilization and deployment 
only applied to 0.26% of the sample.  Therefore, deployment variables are omitted from 
Model 2 and the model focuses primarily on more standard characteristics relating to 
continuation. Below is Model 2 for the Pre-9/11 time period: 
Model 2 
)) ((






It is important to note that NPS reservists during the Model 2 time period are 
likely to have joined with no expectations of mobilizing and, except for the 
extraordinarily small percentage mentioned above, did not mobilize.  This time period is 
comprised of those enlisting between Fiscal Years (FY) 1992–1995 who reached the 
decision point to continue service between FY 1998–2001 (see Figure 9). 
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3. Model 3: Overlap 9/11 Time Period 
In contrast to Model 2, the Overlap period for Model 3 experienced significant 
deployment (51% of the sample, see Table 7).  In order to capture the particular effects of 
frequency and type of mobilizations, four sub-models are considered. 
For Model 3A, the variables for mobilized 1–6 months, mobilized 7–12 months, 
and mobilized twice were included.  The resulting Model 3A is: 
Model 3A 
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Model 3B mirrors Model 3A, but excludes mobilized twice.  The justification for 
applying this technique is to analyze the effect of mobilization duration without 
considering mobilization frequency. 
Model 3B 
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In contrast to Model 3B, Model 3C omits mobilization duration but includes the 
mobilized twice variable.  This serves to analyze the particular effect of mobilizing twice 
without regard to the duration of mobilization variables (mobilized 1–6 months and 
mobilized 7–12 months). 
Model 3C 
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Model 3D for the Overlap-9/11 time period includes mobilized twice, overseas 
deployment once, and the interaction term variable created for previously deployed 
overseas and mobilized twice.  Since being previously deployed overseas and being 
mobilized twice are closely associated, this model attempts to tease out the mutual effects 
on continuation that these variables jointly produce. 
Model 3D 
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It is notable that NPS reservists joining during the Model 3 Overlap-9/11 time 
period were likely to have no expectations of mobilizing but in many cases most likely 
did mobilize.   Prior to the 9/11 time period, previous trends of little or no deployment 
could have been assumed by reservists.  However, in the years immediately following 
9/11, mobilizations became imminent and reservists’ expectations were unmet.  
Consequently, deployment could have an effect on continuation behavior for groups 
during this period.  Model 3 analyzes the effects on those who enlisted from FY 1996-
2001 and who reached the decision point to continue service between FY 2002-2007 (see 
Figure 9). 
4. Model 4: Post-9/11 Time Period 
Model 4, similar to Model 3, also considers a period where deployment was a 
significant factor and, therefore, follows the same four sub-model analyses used in Model 
3 (Overlap-9/11).  Since the reasons for the particular sub-model approach coincide with 
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Reserve expectations for Model 4, the Post-9/11 period, were starkly in contrast to 
expectations in previous time periods.  NPS reservists joining during this time period 
were likely to have clear expectations of mobilizing and most likely did mobilize.  In fact, 
84% of NPS reservists during this time period mobilized at least once (see Table 8).  The 
Post-9/11 period identified for Model 4 is defined as those NPS reservists who enlisted 
from FY 2002–2003 and who reached the decision point to continue service between FY 
2008–2009 (see Figure 14). 
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C. MODELS 1-4: OTHER EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
The other explanatory variables included in each model are also critical in this 
analysis.  These variables were jointly and generically referred to as “explanatory 
variables” in the model specifications above.  These variables include demographics, 
military performance, education benefits, unit type, geographic region, and the 
unemployment rate.  As most of these variables innately define reservists, they may 
present a possible effect on continuation rates by sub-cultures.  For example, those 
reservists from one particular geographic region may have a distinct commonality that 
affects their likelihood of continuation as opposed to those from a different geographic 
region.  Consequently, these variables were included in Models 1–4 and they are defined 
below in Table 10.   
Table 10.   Explanatory Variables Models 1–4 
Regression Base Variables and Explanatory Variables Defined 
Category Used in Regression Base Group 
Demographics     
    Gender Female Male 
Black 




    Marital Status 
Divorced 
Single 
    Dependents One or More Children No Children 
    Age Age   
Alternate High School Diploma 
    Education 
Any College Degree 
High School Diploma 
Military Performance     
    AFQT AFQT Low Quality Score AFQT High Quality Score 
2nd Class PFT Score 
3rd Class PFT Score 
PFT Failure 
     PFT Score 
PFT Score Exempt (Deployed) 
1st Class PFT Score 
PFT Exempt (Medical) 
  
   Proficiency and Conduct Score Aggregate Pro/Con Score    
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Regression Base Variables and Explanatory Variables Defined 
Category Used in Regression Base Group 
    Rank 
Lance Corporal (LCpl) 
Sergeant (Sgt) 
Private (Pvt) 
Private First Class (PFC) 
Corporal (Cpl) 
Education Benefits     
    MGIB Use MGIB previously used  MGIB Currently in use 
Unit Type      
Logistics Group (MLG) 
  
Air Wing (MAW) 
Division Unit (Div) 
Geographic Regions     
Midwest East 
Midwest West 
New England  
Mid Atlantic 
South Atlantic  
South East 
South East Central 
     Census Regions 
West Mountain  
West Pacific  
Unemployment Rate (State) Unemployment Rate   
 
Table 10 provides a quick reference guide to the explanatory variables utilized in 
the regressions, along with the variables that were used as (comparison) in the base 
group.  Additionally, for PFT scores, PFT exempt for medical reasons was also left in the 
base group with the 1st Class PFT scores.  PFT medically exempt only accounts for less 
than 1% of the total sample population.  Similarly, Pvt and PFC were also left in the base 
group since these variables account for 1.6% and 2.6% of the population, respectively. 
D. HYPOTHESIZED EFFECTS OF VARIABLES ON CONTINUATION 
It is hypothesized that the explanatory variables mentioned above will 
significantly affect continuation rates.  Table 11 details the “hypothesized effects” of 
each variable based on the previous research on reserve retention/continuation factors.  
For each explanatory variable, an effect on continuation is hypothesized for the Pre-9/11, 
Overlap-9/11, and the Post-9/11 time periods.  For example, mobilized 7–12 months is 
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not given a hypothesized effect in the Pre-9/11 period due to the near absence of 
deployment during that period.  However, in the Overlap-9/11 period, it is hypothesized 
that the effect of this variable will be negative since reservists’ mobilization expectations 
were ambiguous and therefore long mobilizations could have negatively impacted their 
continuation.  Finally, 7–12 months mobilization is hypothesized to have a positive effect 
on continuation in the Post-9/11 period since expectations for mobilization were clear.  
Hypothesized effects for the other variables are likewise delineated in Table 11. 
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Table 11.   Hypothesized Effects of Explanatory Variables 
Category Explanatory Variable Pre-9/11 Overlap-9/11 Post-9/11 
Previously Deployed Overseas ∙  ‐  ‐ 
Mobilized 1-6 Months ∙  +  + 
Mobilized 7-12 Months ∙  ‐  ‐ 
Deployment 
Mobilized Twice ∙  +  + 
Gender Female +  ‐  ‐ 
Black +  +  + 
Asian ‐  ‐  ‐ Race 
Other +  +  + 
Married ‐  ‐  ‐ Marital Status 
Divorced +  +  + 
Dependents One or More Children ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Age Age ∙  ∙  ∙ 
Alternate High School Diploma +  +  + Education 
Any College Degree ‐  ‐  ‐ 
AFQT AFQT Low Quality Score ∙  ∙  ∙ 
2nd Class PFT Score ‐  ‐  ‐ 
3rd Class PFT Score ‐  ‐  ‐ 
PFT Failure ‐  ‐  ‐ 
PFT Score 
PFT Exempt (Deployment) ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Pro/Con Score Pro/Con Score +  +  + 
Lance Corporal (LCpl) +  +  + Rank 
Sergeant (Sgt) +  ‐  ‐ 
MGIB Usage MGIB previously used  +  ‐  + 
Marine Logistics Group (MLG) ‐  ‐  ‐ Unit Type 
Marine Air Wing (MAW) +  +  + 
Midwest East ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Midwest West +  ‐  ‐ 
New England +  ‐  ‐ 
Mid Atlantic +  ‐  ‐ 
South Atlantic +  +  + 
South East +  +  + 
South East Central +  +  + 
Geographic 
Regions 
West Mountain ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Unemployment  
Rate (State) Unemployment Rate +  +  + 
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IX MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This chapter will present the multivariate analysis results for each model 
emphasizing the effects of mobilization. Further discussion will be provided for 
statistically significant factors associated with NPS continuation findings.  Full tables of 
the results will be available in the Appendices.  Section A will discuss the techniques 
used for validating the statistical model. Section B will interpret the model results for the 
mobilization effects for each “period model” (Pre-9/11, Overlap-9/11, and Post-9/11 
Models).  Section C will present a supplementary results discussion with regard to the 
most relevant and statistically significant findings, which are in addition to the primary 
mobilization effects findings.  Section D provides a comprehensive summary to the 
chapter. 
A. LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST 
The Likelihood Ratio Test considers whether there is a significant difference 
between the unrestricted and restricted models.  For each time period (null model), the 
likelihood ratio test will consider the significance of these sub-models, i.e. whether each 
of the sub-models mentioned above provide a better analysis of the data by including 
different mobilizations variables.  The log likelihood function is as follows: 
)(2LR rur    
where ur is the log likelihood for the unrestricted model and r is the log likelihood for 
the restricted model (Wooldridge, 2009, p.580).  If the log likelihood tests results in 
statistical significance, it can be concluded that at least one of the explanatory variables 
included in the model are beneficial in predicting continuation rates.  Statistical 
significance will be considered for P values less than 0.05.  The results of the likelihood 




B. MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR MOBILIZATION 
EFFECTS  
As mentioned above, there are some intrinsic complexities associated with the 
mobilization and deployment variables.  For instance, those that deployed twice may also 
fall into the category of those who mobilized 7–12 months.  Conversely, those deployed 
overseas may also correspond to those who have been mobilized 1–6 months and 7–12 
months or mobilized twice.  Therefore, various specific models will account for this 
overlap by utilizing the sub-models described above. The full regression results 
containing all explanatory variables can be found in Appendices (B–D). 
1. Model 1: Full Sample 
The first step provides a broad perspective of mobilization effects and their 
potential relevance within the specific periods (Pre-9/11, Overlap-9/11, and Post-9/11).  
Table 12 provides the full sample probit regression results.  For Models 1A and 1B only 
mobilization variables are shown, the full regression containing all 30 explanatory 
variables can be found in Appendix B.    
Table 12.   Model 1: Full Sample Mobilization Probit Model 




Overlap-9/11 Time Period Dummy 0.0399***   
  (0.00594)   
Post-9-11 Time Period Dummy 0.0308***   
  (0.00932)   
Previously Deployed Overseas   -0.0127** 
    (0.00513) 
Observations 31,585 31,566 
LR χ2  47.01 5.80 
 Prob > χ2  0.0000 0.016 
Degrees of Freedom 32 31 
χ2 778.7 740.0 
Pseudo R2 0.0245 0.0233 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Model 1A indicates that there is statistical significance among the Overlap-9/11 
and Post-9/11 periods as compared to the base group dummy of Pre-9/11 period when 
mobilization variables are removed from the regression.  The positive marginal effects of 
4.0 percentage points (p<0.01) for the Overlap-9/11 period and 3.1 percentage points 
(p<0.01) for the Post-9/11 period indicate that continuation rates significantly increased 
in the later time periods as compared to the Pre-9/11 time period. The statistical 
significance presents justification to further examine effects occurring within each 
restricted time period. 
For Model 1B, the variable of previously deployed overseas was included in the 
full sample regression to test for an overall deployment/mobilization effect and yielded a 
1.3 percentage point decrease in continuation (p<.05).  To examine the preliminary 
mobilization results further, Models 3–4 (Overlap-9/11 and Post-9/11 periods) are 
examined in order to place these mobilization effects into perspective.  Unfortunately, 
Model 2 cannot provide help to interpret mobilization effects since NPS reservists hardly 
deployed during the Pre-9/11 period (see Table 6).  Therefore, we only present effects for 
other non-mobilization variable interpretations. 
2. Model 2: Pre-9/11 Time Period 
Although the Pre-9/11 time period was inconclusive for testing mobilization 
effects, a general model was estimated to identify statistically significant factors 
associated with NPS continuation rates.  Table 13 presents the results of Model 2. 
Table 13.   Model 2 Pre-9/11 Regression Results 
VARIABLES  Model 2 
Marginal Effects 
Female 0.0256 
  (0.0359) 
Black 0.0507*** 
  (0.0172) 
Asian -0.0271 
  (0.0214) 
Other 0.0620*** 
  (0.0148) 
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  (0.0101) 
Divorced -0.0203 
  (0.0308) 
One or More Children 0.00444 
  (0.0103) 
Age 0.00701*** 
  (0.00212) 
AFQT Low Quality Score 0.0105 
  (0.0112) 
Alternate High School Diploma 0.0273 
  (0.0281) 
Any College Degree -0.0213 
  (0.0155) 
Lance Corporal -0.0119 
  (0.0137) 
Sergeant 0.0820*** 
  (0.0114) 
Proficiency/Conduct Score 0.00618** 
  (0.00307) 
2nd Class PFT Score -0.0423*** 
  (0.00904) 
3rd Class PFT Score -0.0699*** 
  (0.0104) 
PFT Failure -0.0877*** 
  (0.0117) 
Marine Air Wing 0.0178 
  (0.0121) 
Marine Logistics Group -0.0267*** 
  (0.00961) 
Midwest East -0.00717 
  (0.0175) 
Midwest West 0.0226 
  (0.0275) 
New England 0.0337 
  (0.0281) 
Mid Atlantic 0.0390** 
  (0.0174) 
South Atlantic 0.0453** 
  (0.0201) 
South East 0.00399 
  (0.0222) 
South East Central 0.0403** 
  (0.0176) 
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West Mountain -0.0126 
  (0.0223) 
Unemployment Rate 0.00433 
  (0.00713) 
Observations 8,264 
Degrees of Freedom 28 
χ2 274.0 
Pseudo R2 0.0359 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The Pre-9/11 time period model has several variables that are statistically 
significant.  In terms of demographics, Black NPS reservists had a 5.1 percentage point 
higher (p<0.01) probability of continuing service.  The “other” race category was 6.2 
percentage points less likely (p<0.01) to continue.  Interestingly, “marital status” and 
“dependent” variables had no statistical significant effects on continuation. 
Military performance variables of rank, proficiency and conduct score, and PFT 
scores all were statistically significant.  Of note, NPS reservists’ who were Sergeants 
were 46% or 8.2 percentage points (p<0.01) were more likely to continue in an SMCR 
unit 12 months beyond their 6-year drilling contracts.  This may indicate that if a reservist 
achieves the rank of senior noncommissioned officer, he/she may possess more intrinsic 
abilities, an increased pay incentive, and a desire to continue based on person job fit 
compatibility.  The same theme may apply to reservists who receive strong proficiency 
and conduct marks.  These factors indicate that they are 3.5% or .6 percentage points 
(p<0.01) more likely to continue 12 months beyond their completed 6-year contracts for 
every one-tenth of a point increase in either the actual proficiency or conduct score.  
Physical fitness test scores follow similar trends.  The more poorly NPS reservists 
performed on their PFT scores, the less likely they were to continue.  Specifically, those 
that scored 2nd class PFT scores were 24% or 4.2 percentage points less likely (p<0.01) 
to continue service.  Those who scored 3rd class PFT scores and also failed their PFTs 
were 7.0 and 8.8 percentage points (p<0.01) less likely to continue.  These performance 
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variables appear to be closely correlated with a person’s particular tastes and job fit 
within the organization.  Performing well suggests that job achievements may be 
correlated with job satisfaction to some degree. 
Isolating for specific unit type, NPS Marines serving in a Marine Logistics Group 
were 2.7 percentage points less likely (p<0.01) to continue.  As mentioned above, unit 
environment can potentially affect perceptions of unit cohesion and job satisfaction and 
different unit types vary culturally within the Marine Corps leading to different work 
climates. 
Geographic regions were isolated for “potential propensity to serve.”  The results 
indicate that there were three regions in this period that had higher continuation rates.  
The Mid Atlantic Region (NJ, NY, PA), South Atlantic Region (FL, GA, SC, NC, VA, 
WV, DC, MD, DE), and the South East Central Region (OK, AR, TX, LA) all had 
increased probabilities of continuation.   
3. Model 3: Overlap-9/11 Period 
Model 3 contains five primary variables of interest that measure mobilization.  
This model analyzes the period when reservists’ expectations about being mobilized may 
have been less certain at their point of enlistment (refer to Figure 3) and thus creating the 
hypothesized potential negative continuation effects.  In order to control for mobilization 
variables during this period, the previously stated 4 sub-models were used and depicted in 
Table 14. The full regression containing all 30 explanatory variables can be found in 
Appendix C.    
Table 14.   Model 3 Overlap-9/11 Period Mobilization Regression Results 









Mobilized 1-6 Months 0.0180* 0.0162     
  (0.0102) (0.0102)     
Mobilized 7-12 Months -0.0456*** -0.0286***     
  (0.00799) (0.00768)     
Mobilized Twice 0.0893***   0.0633*** 0.161*** 
  (0.0121)   (0.0111) (0.0439) 
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Previously Deployed Overseas   -0.0518*** 




  (0.00752) 
Previously Deployed Overseas 
*Mobilized Twice       
-0.0637** 
(0.0305) 
Observations 16,956 16,956 16,956 16,944 
LR χ2  88.05 26.19 35.93 93.41 
 Prob > χ2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Degrees of Freedom 33 32 31 33 
χ2 504.1 442.6 452.3 509.7 
Pseudo R2 0.0288 0.0252 0.0258 0.0291 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Model 3A in Table 14 analyzes the variables of deployment frequency and 
duration combined together in the regression.  Specifically, mobilized 1–6 months, 
mobilized 7–12 months, and mobilized twice were included in the regression in order to 
test for effect of deployment frequency.  The results indicate that during the Overlap-9/11 
period, being mobilized 1–6 months increased the probability of continuing service by 
1.8 percentage points (p<0.1).  In contrast to this, reservists who were mobilized 7–12 
months, were 4.6 percentage points less likely (p<0.01) to continue service.  Furthermore, 
those who were mobilized twice during this time period were 9.0 percentage points more 
likely (p<0.01) to continue compared to those who only mobilized once.  These results 
suggest that deployment frequency is a factor in NPS continuation rates.     
Model 3B isolates the impact for being mobilized 1–6 months and 7–12 months, 
but omits being mobilized twice in the regression. The results are consistent in sign 
direction with Model 3A but were only statistically significant for those deployed 7–12 
months.  Those mobilized 7–12 months were 2.9 percentage points less likely (p< 0.01) 
to continue service.  The results suggest that there is a negative trend in the effect of 
longer mobilizations.  This is consistent with the previous research on mobilization 
frequencies for Marine reservists, where those who were mobilized in excess of 1–-6 
months were more likely to become a loss, and loss rates increased as mobilization length 
increased (Dolfini-Reed et al, 2005). 
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Model 3C isolates the effect of being mobilized twice in the regression and 
concludes that NPS reservists who mobilized twice during this time period were 6.3 
percentage points more likely (p<0.01) to continue.  This confirms that being mobilized 
twice is systematically different compared to those only mobilized once at either duration 
(1–6 months or 7–12 months).  Previous research has indicated that on average across all 
the service branches, reservists who were mobilized more than once had higher loss rates.  
However, specific effects of multiple mobilizations may mask the actual effects due to 
the proportion of those reservists who volunteer for additional mobilizations with other 
SMCR units (Dolfini-Reed et al, 2005). Therefore, the increased continuation 
probabilities for those who mobilized more than once may be associated with these self-
selection factors.  Additionally, other factors need to be considered since those who 
mobilize twice may be volunteering because their civilian jobs may be more supportive 
and may potentially impact their deployment experiences more positively than those who 
are involuntarily mobilized and are in civilian jobs that are not supported by reserve duty 
demands.  Additionally, as indicated in the increased unemployment rates during the 
Overlap-9/11 period from the Pre-9/11 period (see Table 6 and 7) some reservists may 
have experienced job loss during this period of economic downturn and thus be more 
inclined to voluntarily mobilize more frequently. 
Model 3D analyzes the interaction effect of being mobilized twice and being 
previously deployed overseas.  The interaction term of overseas deployment once versus 
mobilized twice, elucidates the connection between the 2 variables.  Mobilized twice by 
itself has an approximately 9.7% (+.161 + -.0639 = .097) positive effect on retention.  In 
contrast, deployment at least once overseas alone has an 11.6% (-.0519 + -.0639 = -.116) 
lower probability on retention.  This interaction effect potentially distinguishes and 
validates that being mobilized twice may indeed yield an increased likelihood on 
continuation in SMCR units, whereas being deployed overseas at least once has negative 
impacts on NPS continuation.  
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4. Model 4: Post-9/11 Period 
Model 4 also contains the same five primary variables.  Just as Model 3 restricted 
the NPS sample exclusively to those who served in the Overlap-9/11 period, Model 4 
restricts the sample for the Post-9/11 time period where reservists’ expectations about 
being mobilized may be the most clear at their point of enlistment, given the perceptible 
Post-9/11 world events to include the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts (refer to Figure 3). 
The mobilization results for the Post-9/11 time period are listed in Table 15.  The results 
follow the same pattern as the Overlap-9/11 period in Model 3.  The full regression 
output can be found in Appendix D. 
Table 15.   Model 4 Post-9/11 Period Mobilization Regression Results 









Mobilized 1-6 Months 0.0637** 0.0504*     
  (0.0308) (0.0303)     
Mobilized 7-12 Months -0.0385* -0.00914     
  (0.0198) (0.0187)     
Mobilized Twice 0.126***   0.112*** 0.118 
  (0.0137)   (0.0132) (0.0923) 
Previously Deployed Overseas       -0.0252 
        (0.0164) 
Previously Deployed Overseas 
*Mobilized Twice       
-0.00112 
(0.0831) 
Observations 6,365 6,365 6,365 6,359 
LR χ2  101.67 6.57 80.91 84.3 
 Prob > χ2  0.0000 0.0374 0.0000 0.0000 
Degrees of Freedom 33 32 31 33 
χ2 283.7 190.2 262.7 267.2 
Pseudo R2 0.0432 0.0290 0.0400 0.0407 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In Model 4A, all of the mobilization variables were statistically significant. NPS 
reservists who were mobilized 1–6 months had a 6.4 percentage point higher (p<0.05) 
probability of continuing service.  This 6.4 percentage point difference is much higher in 
the Post-9/11 period than the 1.8 percentage point difference for mobilized 1–6 months in 
 118
the Overlap-9/11 period, and may further reinforce the previous research that suggests 
that decreased deployment lengths result in higher retention (Dolfini-Reed et al, 2005).  
Those who were mobilized 7–12 months had a 3.9 percentage point lower (p<0.1) 
likelihood of continuing service.  This is a much smaller percentage point effect than in 
the Overlap-9/11 period and may potentially be the first piece of evidence that the “clear 
expectations of mobilizations” during this period are possibly correlated with smaller 
negative effects on continuation.  Additionally, reservists who were mobilized twice were 
12.6 percentage points more likely to continue in service than those who had not been 
twice mobilized.  This result suggests that NPS reservists serving in this time period 
differ from other periods for two potential reasons.  First, Post-9/11 period reservists had 
potentially more opportunities to volunteer for additional deployments since the twice 
mobilized rate during this period is 30% (see Table 8 and Figure 12) as compared to the 
Overlap-9/11 period where twice mobilized rates were only 12% (see Table 7 and Figure 
12).  Second, during this Post-9/11 period, reservists may have had “clearer expectations” 
at the point of enlistment entry which could have led to better first time mobilization 
experiences.  Previous studies hypothesized that reservists “willingness to serve” for 
further mobilizations may be linked to how disillusioned they are with the mobilization 
system (Dolfini-Reed et al, 2005, p.20).  Hence, the “clear expectations” regarding 
mobilizations in the Post-9/11 time period may be cause for more “willingness to 
volunteer” for multiple mobilizations since their previous mobilization outlooks may be 
much more positive than in other time periods where expectations were uncertain. 
In Model 4B, being mobilized for 1–6 months was statistically significant.  
Reservists who fell into this category were 5 percentage points more likely (p<0.1) to 
continue in SMCR units. The lack of statistical significance for a 7–12 month 
mobilization presents an interesting finding, given that the percentage of those NPS 
reservists who mobilized 7–12 months during the Post-9/11 period (85%) is much higher 
than in the previous Overlap-9/11 period (50%) (See Tables 7 and 8).  At a minimum, 
this finding may suggest that “clear expectations” in the Post-9/11 period lessen the 
negative impacts of mobilization on continuation behavior. 
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Model 4C indicates that for reservists who mobilized twice in the Post-9/11 
period were 11.2 percentage points more likely (p<0.01) to continue (compared to those 
who were mobilized once).  This result is 5 percentage points larger than for those who 
were mobilized twice in the Overlap-9/11 period.  Again, the potential explanation for 
this could be the increased opportunities to volunteer for additional mobilizations.  
Alternatively, “expectations may be clearer” in previous mobilizations resulting in more 
volunteers for a second mobilization.   
Model 4D produced an interesting result where the interaction effects between 
those that mobilized twice and those who deployed overseas at least once were not 
statistically significant.  Although the analysis can only utilize 2-years of waterfall data, 
Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009 (see Figures 3 and 9), it does present support for the 
hypothesis that “clear expectations” for mobilizations may cause systematic differences 
for NPS reservists who enlist in the Post-9/11 period (2002 and beyond).  More 
specifically, as Figure 3 suggests, “clear expectations” of mobilizing for a reservist may 
be imperative since reservists need to plan around school schedules and civilian jobs.  
Those entering into 6-year commitments who know just how they will ultimately be 
utilized through the imminent possibility of mobilizing may have fewer unexpected 
disruptions in their civilian lives, unlike the Overlap-9/11 Period.  Reservists expecting to 
only train during the usual 1-weekend per month and 2-weeks per year may be affected 
more than those who expect the higher commitment up front.  
Those in the Overlap-9/11 period may have joined with virtually no expectation 
of deploying, and although their tastes for military service are positive, they may not 
anticipate having their civilian lives disrupted for 7–12 months.  Loss rates will be higher 
since their expectations were simply not met.  Reservists enlisting during the Post-9/11 
period may also possess different goals than those who enlisted during the Pre-9/11 and 
Overlap-9/11 periods.  Although this analysis may seem premature to assign, the level in 
which mobilization expectations explain retention during their 6-year enlistment period, 
it does appear to be related and is supported by this multivariate analysis.  In order to 
validate this with more precision, further analysis will be needed to investigate data 
extending beyond those NPS reservists who enlisted after 2004.   
 120
C. DISCUSSION OF RETENTION EFFECTS OF OTHER EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES 
While not the primary focus of this thesis, this supplementary discussion presents 
some interesting findings that exist across the various explanatory variable categories of: 
Demographics, Military Performance, Unit Type, and Geographic Regions.  Notably, this 
discussion may provide relevant insight into NPS continuation behavior that exists 
beyond the effects of mobilization.  The full regression results are presented in 
Appendices B–D and Table 13. 
1. Effects of Demographics on Retention 
A common approach within both corporations and the military is to examine 
trends and patterns of personnel that occur within their organizations.  Human capital is 
always of interest and vital to solving costly problems associated with training costs, 
attrition, and retention.  Controlling for differences in demographic background can 
ultimately assist planners to mitigate future problematic patterns that may arise due to 
recruiting certain groups (Dolfini-Reed et al., 2005).  Therefore, this analysis will present 
some relevant demographic findings. 
First, as noted before in the descriptive statistics chapter, NPS females who 
complete their 6-year contracts only comprise approximately 3% of the reservists. When 
comparing continuation across all three time periods (Pre, Overlap, and Post-9/11), 
female continuation behavior appears to have changed over time.  Specifically, during the 
Pre-9/11 time period, regression analysis revealed that female continuation was 
statistically insignificant whereas during the Overlap-9/11 females were on average 4.7 
percentage points less likely (p<0.01) to continue.  On the other hand, during the Post-
9/11 time period the results detail a slight shift in statistical significance.  Although the 
marginal values are still negative and significant, the statistical level was reduced at 
(p<0.1) from the previous (p<0.01) indicating that negative continuation effects could be 
diminishing slightly over time and warrant future analysis into this area.  
The race variables also present some insight into NPS behavior across the three 
time periods.  NPS Blacks, Asians, and those categorized as Other Race all had 
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interesting trends.  Blacks during the Pre-9/11 and Overlap-9/11 time periods increased 
from being 5 percentage points to 8 percentage points more likely (p<0.01) to continue.  
However, during the Post-9/11 time period, the results were not significant.  Asian’s, 
however, were only statistically significant during the Post-9/11 time period where they 
were on average 5 percentage points less likely (p<0.05) to continue as compared to 
whites across Models 4A-4D.  For those categorized as “Other Race,” the patterns were 
similar to Blacks where they had strong propensity to continue in service during the Pre-
9/11 and Overlap-9/11 time periods, yet only indicated positive statistical significance for 
2 out of the 4 sub-model within the Post-9/11 period.  These trends may suggest that key 
racial categories have less of an effect on continuation rates as time progresses into the 
Post-9/11 period.  Further research in this area is also needed. 
The dependents category revealed some unique findings that contrast to those of 
active duty studies.  Empirical research on first term active-duty Marines and 
deployments has indicated higher reenlistment rates for both those who are married and 
married with dependents (Quester et al., 2006).  This study’s results indicated the 
opposite effect: being married resulted in lower continuation for NPS reservists.  Also, a 
shift seemed to occur between the Pre-9/11 and Overlap-9/11 time periods.  Prior to 9/11, 
being married had no effect on continuation (a time of no deployment requirements), 
whereas during the Overlap-9/11 period, married reservists were 2.9 percentage points 
less likely (p<0.01) to continue.  However, being married in the Post-9/11 period was not 
significant.  This potentially suggests that “clear expectations” may also be correlated 
with continuation propensity.  As previous research has revealed (Grissmer, 1992), 
spousal attitudes towards reserve service plays a large role in retention and could be 
linked to the results for the Post-9/11 time period.  Reservists who know they will be 
mobilized will most likely share this expectation with their spouses, who in turn, are also 
made aware of the potential future sacrifice associated with deployment. 
Divorce patterns are also eye-catching whereas being divorced in the Pre-9/11 and 
Overlap-9/11 periods was not significant.  However, during the Post-9/11 period, being 
divorced resulted in a 9.4 percentage point higher probability (p<0.05) of continuation.  
This figure is confounding and may further support the basic premise that spousal 
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impacts are important and that time spent away from home during lengthy mobilization 
does affect a person’s propensity to continue in service (compared to those who are 
divorced).  However it should be considered that divorced NPS reservists only account 
for 1.79% of the population and, therefore, it is difficult assign definitive conclusions. 
Finally, having one or more children increased the likelihood for continuation on 
average by 2.6 to 3.4 percentage points between the Overlap-9/11 and Post-9/11 time 
periods.  While being married decreases the probability of continuing, having children 
has the opposite effect. Logically, this could be due to the added responsibility of 
providing for children and therefore a desire to maintain a stable employment status. 
Further analysis will be needed to help determine potential reasons associated with this 
pattern. 
2. Effects of Military Performance Variables on Retention 
Military service demands a great deal of adaptability, as well as the physical, 
mental, and technical capability to perform in high stress environments.  Therefore, it is 
important to investigate the effect of military performance characteristics on 
continuation.  Furthermore, much of the person’s ability to perform in a military setting 
also reflects person-job fit.  The results revealed that both physical fitness scores and 
proficiency and conduct scores had positive effects on continuation.  As indicated in the 
full regression results across all three time periods, NPS reservists who scored 2nd class 
and below for the PFT were less likely to continue in service as compared against those 
who had a 1st Class score.  Also, those who averaged high proficiency and conduct 
marks “during the Overlap-9/11 period only” were more likely to continue in service by 
.8 percentage points (p<0.01).  These results support the notion that performing well 
signals a person’s compatibility within a job, as well as a person’s ability, which can be 
linked to greater motivation. 
3. Effects of Unit Type on Retention 
When compared against Marine Division Units, NPS reservists who served in a 
Marine Logistics Group were less likely to continue service for the Pre-9/11 and Overlap-
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9/11 periods (by 2.7 and 1.9 percentage points, respectively).  However, during the Post-
9/11 period, the coefficients were statistically insignificant.  This shift necessitates the 
need for further analysis.  Moreover, NPS Marines serving in Marine Air Wing were 
statistically more likely to continue in the Overlap and Post-9/11 time periods.  This 
could be due to a multitude of factors but does imply that a systematic difference may 
exist among those serving within these three different job climates. 
4. Effects of Geographic Region on Continuation 
As previously mentioned, this analysis utilized regional dummy variables to 
isolate for unobserved “propensity to serve.”  However, the analysis has provided a 
framework for future study in this area.  There is much to be gained from investigating 
the effect of geography as CNA researchers have found this to be a relevant and an 
important retention factor. Commonly referred to as neighborhood effects, this approach 
attempts to model how people’s behavior is affected by those who are similarly situated 
(Dolfini-Reed et al., 2005, p.30). Additionally, reserve participation in general has 
already been identified by CNA as a problem that is related to metropolitan size.  Larger 
metropolitan areas have higher drill site unit populations versus rural areas, leading to 
staffing difficulties among certain drill sites (Dolfini-Reed & Bowling, 2010).  For 
example, many reserve units experience both under-recruiting and over-recruiting as a 
result of specific variations in geographic population densities, as well as, experience 
problems of demographic mix within certain units based on their locations.  Thus, the 
consideration of geographic regions can add great depth to the overall analysis and could 
help improve Marine Corps recruiting strategies for certain regions. 
The South East region had the highest negative continuation probabilities in the 
Overlap and Post-9/11 periods.  Over time, the marginal effects reached as high as 9 
percentage points (p<0.01).  This negative retention effect in this region necessitates 
further investigation.  The Mid-Atlantic and New England regions were only affected by 
negative continuation probability during the Overlap-9/11 period.  Both regions are in the 
upper northeast and further analysis would be required to examine whether possible 
economic and other factors that may be associated with reserve continuation behavior.  
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Lastly, NPS reservists serving in the West Mountain region had statistically significant 
results for the Post-9/11 period only and were 8.2 percentage points less likely to 
continue. 
D. SUMMARY 
In summary, regression analysis has shown that mobilization frequency and type 
are potentially correlated with continuation rates, and that the effect varies by period. 
Specifically, during the Overlap-9/11 and Post-9/11 periods, being mobilized 1–6 months 
tends to have more positive impacts on continuation rates as compared to the 
mobilization duration of 7–12 months.  This finding is in line with previous CNA 
research pertaining to deployment tempo and frequency for Marine reservists (Dolfini-
Reed & McHugh, 2007). 
We find that NPS reservists who have been previously deployed overseas during 
the Overlap-9/11 period are less likely to continue.  This effect was statistically 
insignificant during the Post-9/11 period. Reservists who mobilize twice have higher 
probabilities of continued service during the Overlap-9/11 and Post-9/11 models.  Also, 
as hypothesized, varying types of mobilization expectations across the three time periods 
(Pre-9/11, Overlap-9/11, and Post-9/11) present unique and systematic differences that 
may strongly influence a reservist’s decision to continue or leave.  Nonetheless, further 
analysis will be required to bolster this conclusion.  The limited number of observations 
available for the Post-9/11 time period (N=6,365) are one primary problem that may 
obstruct more definitive findings and conclusions, along with higher variations of 
deployment between the Overlap-9/11 and Post-9/11 time periods since the mobilization 
rates for the Overlap-9/11 and Post-9/11 time periods were 51% and 84%, respectively.  
Also, this thesis finds that key demographic, military performance, unit type, and 
geographic region variables significantly affect retention.  These additional findings have 
allowed greater insight into specific characteristics and patterns associated with NPS 
reserve behavior as a whole, as well as have earmarked several key additional avenues to 
explore in future research. 
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X. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. REVIEW OF RESEARCH GOALS AND METHODS 
The primary goal of this thesis was to identify the effect of mobilization on 
Marine Corps non-prior service (NPS) personnel continuation in SMCR units.  Due to the 
increased mobilization of reservists in the Post-9/11 period, it was essential to gain 
insight on how this may be affecting continuation behavior.  Additionally, the research 
considered the changes in reservists’ expectations on mobilization and their effect on 
continuation decisions in three different time periods—Pre-9/11, Overlap-9/11, and the 
Post-9/11 periods. 
Since the NPS reserve population is dominated by the 6x2 service contract-type 
among obligors, it is of vital interest to the Marine Corps to critically analyze 
continuation behavior of this group.  Significantly, NPS reservists account for 
approximately 98% of all obligors.  However, continuation rates among those who have 
completed their contract in this group are approximately 19%.  Consequently, the impact 
of retention behavior among this group is critical to both Marine Corps accession 
practices, as well as the surrounding issues that pertain to growing a healthy senior 
reserve force.  Thus, NPS reservists in SMCR units constituted the population of interest 
for this research. 
The research utilized monthly TFDW data of NPS reserve enlisted personnel who 
have completed their initial 6-year obligated drilling contracts.  In order to capture the 
focal point “waterfall time period,” monthly snapshots of data were utilized 
encompassing the time period from end-of-obligated-service through 12-months beyond 
completion.  The analyses of effects, dependent on time period, were separated after the 
initial analysis of the full data sample.  Subsequently, the key enlistment periods were 
categorized as: Pre-9/11, Overlap-9/11, and Post-9/11.  The Pre-9/11 period was selected 
based on NPS reservists who completed their contracts during Fiscal Years (FY) 1998–
2001.  The Overlap-9/11 period was defined as those enlisting between FY 1996–2001 
and completing their contracts during FY 2002 – 2007, thus capturing reservists who had 
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no expectation of mobilizing but who likely did mobilize.  Finally, the Post-9/11 period 
was defined to capture reservists who enlisted during FY 2002–2003, in a period where 
mobilizations appeared imminent and could be clearly expected by enlistees. 
 Due to the increased mobilization and deployment demands caused by world 
events stemming from September 11, 2001, such as the ongoing Iraq and Afghanistan 
conflicts, mobilization effects on continuation is a primary focus of this thesis.   
Consequently, mobilization effects were considered along both the frequency and 
duration dimensions.  The thesis analyzes the following categories:  those who deployed 
overseas at least once, those who mobilized 1–6 months, those who mobilized 7–12 
months, and those who mobilized twice. 
As a supplementary insight on other factors that may be associated with NPS 
continuation, the multivariate models also included independent variables associated with 
demographics, ability, job performance, rank, military experience, and primary 
occupational specialty, unit type, unemployment rates, geographic location, and 
Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) benefits.  Consideration of the above categories offered 
additional perspective as well as controlled for factors aside from mobilization that could 
affect continuation rates. 
B. PRIMARY RESEARCH OUTCOMES 
The thesis found that mobilization frequency and duration were important factors 
explaining NPS reserve continuation, with effects defined by period.  During the 
Overlap-9/11 period when reserve mobilization expectations were undefined, overseas 
deployment had a statistically negative effect on continuation rates.  In contrast, during 
the Post-9/11 period, with clear mobilization expectations, overseas deployment did not 
statistically affect continuation rates.  Consequently, it is plausible to infer that overseas 
deployment does not negatively impact continuation if initial expectations of deployment 
are clear.  Additionally, multiple mobilizations had a positive impact on continuation past 
the end of the first contract, which may be affected by the self-selecting nature of NPS 
reservists who have volunteered for additional deployments. 
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Mobilization duration effects differed across the Overlap and Post-9/11 time 
periods, where reserve expectations were different.  During the Overlap-9/11 period, a 1–
6 month mobilization had a small positive effect on continuation, which increased in 
significance in the Post-9/11 time period.  Accordingly, while a reservist would be 
slightly more likely to continue during the Overlap-9/11 time period if they had 
previously mobilized for 1–6 months a similar reservist in the Post-9/11 period would be 
even more likely to continue.  In comparison, a mobilization of 7–12 months during the 
Overlap-9/11 time period had a strong negative effect on continuation, but a somewhat 
smaller effect in the Post-9/11 time period. 
Among the demographic factors that predict continuation, race was of notable 
interest.  During the Pre-9/11 and Overlap-9/11 periods, being black had a statistically 
significant positive effect on continuation.  However, by the Post-9/11 period, this effect 
became neutral; suggesting that being black may no longer be an important continuation 
predictor.  In a similar trend, being married during the Overlap-9/11 time period had a 
negative effect on continuation while having at least one child had a strong positive 
effect; the significance of both of these factors diminished during the Post-9/11 period.  
Other factors that indicated a significant effect on continuation were military 
performance, MGIB usage, unit type, and geographical location. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis analyzed key continuation factors among NPS reservists who 
completed their initial 6-year drilling contracts.  However, future analysis is 
recommended to determine whether the significant predictors of continuation correspond 
to significant predictors of attrition.  Therefore, a study of NPS attrition utilizing this data 
and similar research considerations would be beneficial to determine factors that might 
simultaneously mitigate attrition and support continuation. 
Although this thesis revealed trends through the Pre-9/11, Overlap-9/11, and Post-
9/11 time periods, available data limited the scope of the Post-9/11 analysis to the years 
of 2002 and 2003.  In order to further validate the trends illuminated by this research a 
follow-up study of NPS reservists who enlisted after 2003 is highly recommended.  This 
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would present a more comprehensive view of the Post-9/11 period, as well as bring a 
current perspective on the operational posture that now exists in post-OIF. 
Based on the results presented in this thesis, a mobilization of 7–12 months 
appears to have a more negative effect on continuation than a mobilization of shorter 
duration.  Consequently, it is recommended that shorter deployment lengths be 
considered as a primary mobilization type in order to mitigate the detrimental effects on 
continuation.  Since shorter 1–6 months mobilization had a significantly positive effect 
on continuation, these types of mobilizations would be the preferred modus operandi.  
Although this is the ideal case, from an operational effectiveness standpoint, it may not 
be entirely realistic. 
For future consideration, it would be important to incorporate an analysis of 
monetary effects on continuation rates.  Specifically, enlistment and reenlistment bonuses 
could help identify pecuniary factors to an individual’s decision to continue service in the 
reserves. However, since reenlistment bonus policy was only recently changed in 2011 to 
provide for bonus eligibility prior to contract completion, it is left as a recommendation 
for future study when data becomes available. 
In summary, this research analyzed the effects of observable factors on NPS 
continuation decisions.  While deployment and demographic aspects were shown to be 
significant, they could not account for the intangible aspects of an individual’s retention 
decision.  These intangible considerations include, but are not limited to, spousal support, 
leadership, and morale.  Therefore, future research would be needed to provide a broader 
view of NPS reserve continuation behavior, by merging the results of this thesis research 
with a study of qualitative factors. 
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APPENDIX A.  TFDW SEQUENCE LISTING 
Mar 1972 - 
Dec 1980 
Mar 1981 - 
Dec 1989 
 Mar 1990 - 
Feb 1998 
Mar 1998 - 
Feb 2001 
Mar 2001 - 
Feb 2004 
Mar 2004 - 
Feb 2007 
Mar 2007 - 
Feb 2010 
Seq Date Seq Date Seq Date Seq Date Seq Date Seq Date Seq Date 
1 31Mar72 37 31Mar81 73 31Mar90 109 31Mar98 145 31Mar01 181 31Mar04 217 31Mar07 
2 30Jun72 38 30Jun81 74 30Jun90 110 30Apr98 146 30Apr01 182 30Apr04 218 30Apr07 
3 30Sep72 39 30Sep81 75 30Sep90 111 31May98 147 31May01 183 31May04 219 31May07 
4 31Dec72 40 31Dec81 76 31Dec90 112 30Jun98 148 30Jun01 184 30Jun04 220 30Jun07 
5 31Mar73 41 31Mar82 77 31Mar91 113 31Jul98 149 31Jul01 185 31Jul04 221 31Jul07 
6 30Jun73 42 30Jun82 78 30Jun91 114 31Aug98 150 31Aug01 186 31Aug04 222 31Aug07 
7 30Sep73 43 30Sep82 79 30Sep91 115 30Sep98 151 30Sep01 187 30Sep04 223 30Sep07 
8 31Dec73 44 31Dec82 80 31Dec91 116 31Oct98 152 31Oct01 188 31Oct04 224 31Oct07 
9 31Mar74 45 31Mar83 81 31Mar92 117 30Nov98 153 30Nov01 189 30Nov04 225 30Nov07 
10 30Jun74 46 30Jun83 82 30Jun92 118 31Dec98 154 31Dec01 190 31Dec04 226 31Dec07 
11 30Sep74 47 30Sep83 83 30Sep92 119 31Jan99 155 31Jan02 191 31Jan05 227 31Jan08 
12 31Dec74 48 31Dec83 84 31Dec92 120 28Feb99 156 28Feb02 192 28Feb05 228 28Feb08 
13 31Mar75 49 31Mar84 85 31Mar93 121 31Mar99 157 31Mar02 193 31Mar05 229 31Mar08 
14 30Jun75 50 30Jun84 86 30Jun93 122 30Apr99 158 30Apr02 194 30Apr05 230 30Apr08 
15 30Sep75 51 30Sep84 87 30Sep93 123 31May99 159 31May02 195 31May05 231 31May08 
16 31Dec75 52 31Dec84 88 31Dec93 124 30Jun99 160 30Jun02 196 30Jun05 232 30Jun08 
17 31Mar76 53 31Mar85 89 31Mar94 125 31Jul99 161 31Jul02 197 31Jul05 233 31Jul08 
18 30Jun76 54 30Jun85 90 30Jun94 126 31Aug99 162 31Aug02 198 31Aug05 234 31Aug08 
19 30Sep76 55 30Sep85 91 30Sep94 127 30Sep99 163 30Sep02 199 30Sep05 235 30Sep08 
20 31Dec76 56 31Dec85 92 31Dec94 128 31Oct99 164 31Oct02 200 31Oct05 236 31Oct08 
21 31Mar77 57 31Mar86 93 31Mar95 129 30Nov99 165 30Nov02 201 30Nov05 237 30Nov08 
22 30Jun77 58 30Jun86 94 30Jun95 130 31Dec99 166 31Dec02 202 31Dec05 238 31Dec08 
23 30Sep77 59 30Sep86 95 30Sep95 131 31Jan00 167 31Jan03 203 31Jan06 239 31Jan09 
24 31Dec77 60 31Dec86 96 31Dec95 132 29Feb00 168 28Feb03 204 28Feb06 240 28Feb09 
25 31Mar78 61 31Mar87 97 31Mar96 133 31Mar00 169 31Mar03 205 31Mar06 241 31Mar09 
26 30Jun78 62 30Jun87 98 30Jun96 134 30Apr00 170 30Apr03 206 30Apr06 242 30Apr09 
27 30Sep78 63 30Sep87 99 30Sep96 135 31May00 171 31May03 207 31May06 243 31May09 
28 31Dec78 64 31Dec87 100 31Dec96 136 30Jun00 172 30Jun03 208 30Jun06 244 30Jun09 
29 31Mar79 65 31Mar88 101 31Mar97 137 31Jul00 173 31Jul03 209 31Jul06 245 31Jul09 
30 30Jun79 66 30Jun88 102 30Jun97 138 31Aug00 174 31Aug03 210 31Aug06 246 31Aug09 
31 30Sep79 67 30Sep88 103 30Sep97 139 30Sep00 175 30Sep03 211 30Sep06 247 30Sep09 
32 31Dec79 68 31Dec88 104 31Oct97 140 31Oct00 176 31Oct03 212 31Oct06 248 31Oct09 
33 31Mar80 69 31Mar89 105 30Nov97 141 30Nov00 177 30Nov03 213 30Nov06 249 30Nov09 
34 30Jun80 70 30Jun89 106 31Dec97 142 31Dec00 178 31Dec03 214 31Dec06 250 31Dec09 
35 30Sep80 71 30Sep89 107 31Jan98 143 31Jan01 179 31Jan04 215 31Jan07 251 31Jan10 
36 31Dec80 72 31Dec89 108 28Feb98 144 28Feb01 180 29Feb04 216 28Feb07 252 28Feb10 
Note 1: The TFDW contains reserve data from Dec 1994(sequence 92) to current. The data was added to the TFDW in 2000. 
Note 2: Sequences 1 through 103 are Quarterly.  Monthly cycles began on Sequence 104 
Note 3: The TFDW used HMF data from March 1976 (sequence 17) through June 1988 (sequence 66). This data was added in January 2008. 
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APPENDIX B.  FULL SAMPLE REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Model 1A Model 1B VARIABLES Marginal Effects Marginal Effects 
Female -0.0324** -0.0302** 
 (0.0128) (0.0129) 
Black 0.0658*** 0.0652*** 
 (0.00948) (0.00946) 
Asian -0.0226** -0.0208* 
 (0.0110) (0.0110) 
Other 0.0474*** 0.0478*** 
 (0.00743) (0.00743) 
Married -0.0193*** -0.0163*** 
 (0.00547) (0.00549) 
Divorced 0.0353* 0.0394** 
 (0.0181) (0.0182) 
At Least one Child 0.0215*** 0.0177*** 
 (0.00651) (0.00644) 
Age 0.00103 0.00105 
 (0.00106) (0.00106) 
AFQT Low Quality Score 0.00790 0.00828 
 (0.00592) (0.00592) 
Alternate High School Diploma 0.0133 0.0139 
 (0.0138) (0.0138) 
Any College Degree -0.0147* -0.0142 
 (0.00892) (0.00893) 
Lance Corporal -0.00360 -0.00371 
 (0.00738) (0.00737) 
Sergeant 0.0686*** 0.0715*** 
 (0.00609) (0.00610) 
Proficiency/Conduct Score 0.00742*** 0.00492*** 
 (0.00180) (0.00177) 
2nd Class PFT Score -0.0295*** -0.0334*** 
 (0.00530) (0.00528) 
3rd Class PFT Score -0.0600*** -0.0662*** 
 (0.00720) (0.00703) 
PFT Failure -0.0707*** -0.0735*** 
 (0.00730) (0.00722) 
PFT Exempt (deployed) -0.0237*** -0.0131 
 (0.00751) (0.00802) 
MGIB used during Enlistment -0.0848*** -0.0789*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0106) 
Marine Air Wing Unit 0.0315*** 0.0317*** 
 (0.00680) (0.00682) 
Marine Logistics Group Unit -0.0149*** -0.0146*** 
 (0.00535) (0.00535) 
Midwest East -0.0125 -0.00987 
 (0.00801) (0.00806) 
Midwest West -0.00316 0.00295 
 (0.0120) (0.0120) 
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Model 1A Model 1B VARIABLES Marginal Effects Marginal Effects 
New England -0.00909 -0.00327 
 (0.0116) (0.0117) 
Mid Atlantic -4.57e-05 0.00486 
 (0.00819) (0.00824) 
South Atlantic -0.00104 0.00495 
 (0.00827) (0.00823) 
South East -0.0403*** -0.0364*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0102) 
South East Central 0.000284 0.00422 
 (0.00839) (0.00842) 
West Mountain -0.0147 -0.0139 
 (0.0110) (0.0111) 
Unemployment Rate (state) 0.00652*** 0.00988*** 
 (0.00181) (0.00150) 
Served during Overlap-9/11 Period 0.0399***  
 (0.00594)  
Served during the Post-9/11 Period 0.0308***  
 (0.00932)  
Previously Deployed Overseas  -0.0127** 
  (0.00513) 
Observations 31,585 31,566 
LR χ2 47.01 5.80 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0160 
Degrees of Freedom 32 31 
χ2 778.7 740.0 
Pseudo R2 0.0245 0.0233 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX C.  OVERLAP-9/11 REGRESSION RESULTS 









Mobilized 1-6 Months 0.0180* 0.0162   
 (0.0102) (0.0102)   
Mobilized 7-12 Months -0.0456*** -0.0286***   
 (0.00799) (0.00768)   
Mobilized Twice 0.0893***  0.0633*** 0.161*** 
 (0.0121)  (0.0111) (0.0439) 
Female -0.0460*** -0.0467*** -0.0443*** -0.0512*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0164) (0.0160) 
Black 0.0821*** 0.0817*** 0.0814*** 0.0805*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) 
Asian -0.00827 -0.00901 -0.00828 -0.00937 
 (0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0154) 
Other 0.0509*** 0.0502*** 0.0511*** 0.0519*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) 
Married -0.0288*** -0.0280*** -0.0294*** -0.0282*** 
 (0.00764) (0.00765) (0.00763) (0.00763) 
Divorced 0.0275 0.0299 0.0247 0.0288 
 (0.0252) (0.0254) (0.0250) (0.0252) 
At Least one Child 0.0332*** 0.0327*** 0.0324*** 0.0335*** 
 (0.00967) (0.00966) (0.00966) (0.00967) 
Age -0.000140 -0.000169 -0.000208 -0.000526 
 (0.00145) (0.00145) (0.00145) (0.00145) 
AFQT Low Quality Score 0.00499 0.00392 0.00405 0.00281 
 (0.00803) (0.00802) (0.00802) (0.00800) 










     
Any College Degree -0.0135 -0.0149 -0.0129 -0.0125 
 (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
Lance Corporal 0.00239 0.00138 0.00352 0.00183 
 (0.00996) (0.00995) (0.00999) (0.00994) 
Sergeant 0.0569*** 0.0612*** 0.0560*** 0.0584*** 
 (0.00853) (0.00856) (0.00853) (0.00855) 
Proficiency/Conduct Score 0.00850*** 0.00832*** 0.00901*** 0.00870*** 
 (0.00242) (0.00243) (0.00243) (0.00242) 
2nd Class PFT Score -0.0300*** -0.0300*** -0.0264*** -0.0299*** 
 (0.00743) (0.00745) (0.00745) (0.00743) 
3rd Class PFT Score -0.0583*** -0.0573*** -0.0524*** -0.0583*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0103) 
PFT Failure -0.0621*** -0.0614*** -0.0567*** -0.0612*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0104) 
PFT Exempt (deployed) -0.0387*** -0.0300*** -0.0469*** -0.0278*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.00977) (0.0106) 
MGIB used during Enlistment -0.119*** -0.116*** -0.119*** -0.119*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0128) (0.0125) (0.0124) 
Marine Air Wing Unit 0.0480*** 0.0451*** 0.0451*** 0.0395*** 
 (0.00964) (0.00959) (0.00959) (0.00953) 
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Marine Logistics Group Unit -0.0204*** -0.0175** -0.0210*** -0.0169** 
 (0.00745) (0.00748) (0.00745) (0.00748) 
Midwest East -0.00449 -0.00331 -0.00495 0.000777 
 (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0115) 
Midwest West -0.0105 -0.0160 -0.000455 -0.0116 
 (0.0169) (0.0166) (0.0173) (0.0168) 
New England -0.0369** -0.0325** -0.0323** -0.0352** 
 (0.0154) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0155) 
Mid Atlantic -0.0367*** -0.0265** -0.0306*** -0.0314*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0107) 
South Atlantic -0.0218* -0.0246** -0.0109 -0.0179 
 (0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0117) 
South East -0.0396*** -0.0431*** -0.0372*** -0.0344** 
 (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0144) (0.0144) 
South East Central -0.00561 -0.00685 -0.00267 -0.00168 
 (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0116) 
West Mountain 0.0117 0.00633 0.0217 0.0127 
 (0.0164) (0.0162) (0.0167) (0.0165) 
Unemployment Rate (state) 0.00479 0.00282 0.0125*** 0.00520 
 (0.00385) (0.00384) (0.00366) (0.00380) 
Previously Deployed 
Overseas 





   -0.0637** 
(0.0305) 
Observations 16,956 16,956 16,956 16,944 
LR χ2 88.05 26.19 35.93 93.41 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Degrees of Freedom 33 32 31 33 
χ2 504.1 442.6 452.3 509.7 
Pseudo R2 0.0288 0.0252 0.0258 0.0291 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX D.  POST-9/11 REGRESSION RESULTS 









Mobilized 1-6 Months 0.0637** 0.0504*   
 (0.0308) (0.0303)   
Mobilized 7-12 Months -0.0385* -0.00914   
 (0.0198) (0.0187)   
Mobilized Twice 0.126***  0.112*** 0.118 
 (0.0137)  (0.0132) (0.0923) 
Female -0.0454* -0.0477* -0.0404 -0.0448* 
 (0.0255) (0.0255) (0.0259) (0.0255) 
Black 0.0342 0.0346 0.0332 0.0324 
 (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0229) 
Asian -0.0498** -0.0543** -0.0481** -0.0489** 
 (0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0227) (0.0226) 
Other 0.0264 0.0272* 0.0267 0.0275* 
 (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) 
Married -0.0220* -0.0179 -0.0213* -0.0206 
 (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
Divorced 0.0918** 0.102** 0.0895** 0.0914** 
 (0.0395) (0.0399) (0.0393) (0.0394) 
At Least one Child 0.0270* 0.0263* 0.0274* 0.0273* 
 (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) 
Age -0.00175 -0.00237 -0.00158 -0.00169 
 (0.00231) (0.00232) (0.00231) (0.00231) 
AFQT Low Quality Score 0.0119 0.0139 0.0111 0.0113 
 (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0139) 










     
Any College Degree 0.00142 -0.00774 0.00134 0.00152 
 (0.0213) (0.0209) (0.0213) (0.0213) 
Lance Corporal -0.0139 -0.0175 -0.0130 -0.0133 
 (0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0184) 
Sergeant 0.0726*** 0.0802*** 0.0704*** 0.0702*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0137) (0.0137) 
Proficiency/Conduct Score 0.00149 0.00354 0.000909 0.00144 
 (0.00532) (0.00534) (0.00532) (0.00532) 
2nd Class PFT Score -0.0159 -0.0178 -0.0161 -0.0161 
 (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) 
3rd Class PFT Score -0.0644*** -0.0658*** -0.0656*** -0.0661*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0233) (0.0232) 
PFT Failure -0.0813*** -0.0844*** -0.0822*** -0.0829*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0170) 
PFT Exempt (deployed) -0.0316** 0.0104 -0.0310** -0.0292** 
 (0.0135) (0.0139) (0.0134) (0.0136) 
MGIB used during Enlistment -0.0632*** -0.0515*** -0.0633*** -0.0624*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0185) (0.0176) (0.0176) 
Marine Air Wing Unit 0.0285* 0.0198 0.0300* 0.0269* 
 (0.0161) (0.0159) (0.0161) (0.0161) 
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Marine Logistics Group Unit 0.0113 0.00872 0.0146 0.0137 
 (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0127) 
Midwest East -0.0404** -0.0309* -0.0461*** -0.0454*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0170) (0.0163) (0.0163) 
Midwest West -0.00547 -0.0145 -0.00876 -0.00928 
 (0.0253) (0.0248) (0.0251) (0.0250) 
New England -0.00801 0.00209 -0.0170 -0.0146 
 (0.0248) (0.0256) (0.0241) (0.0243) 
Mid Atlantic 0.0219 0.0236 0.0197 0.0209 
 (0.0192) (0.0193) (0.0191) (0.0191) 
South Atlantic -0.00781 -0.00897 -0.0122 -0.0124 
 (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0177) (0.0177) 
South East -0.0852*** -0.0817*** -0.0902*** -0.0889*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0197) (0.0188) (0.0189) 
South East Central -0.0215 -0.0293 -0.0286 -0.0274 
 (0.0186) (0.0184) (0.0183) (0.0183) 
West Mountain -0.0781*** -0.0853*** -0.0806*** -0.0845*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0200) (0.0203) (0.0201) 
Unemployment Rate (state) 0.00730*** 0.00511** 0.00689*** 0.00681*** 
 (0.00246) (0.00245) (0.00245) (0.00246) 
Previously Deployed 
Overseas 





   -0.00112 
(0.0831) 
Observations 6,365 6,365 6,365 6,359 
LR χ2 101.67 6.57 80.91 84.30 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0374 0.0000 0.0000 
Degrees of Freedom 33 32 31 33 
χ2 283.7 190.2 262.7 267.2 
Pseudo R2 0.0432 0.0290 0.0400 0.0407 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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